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ABSTRACT 
Climate change poses an unprecedented risk to global human security and future 
generations. Yet actions to mitigate or adapt to the changing climate system vary 
greatly among countries and their constituencies. Despite mounting evidence detailing 
the economic, social, and ecological risks of climate change, many scholars agree that 
the greatest threats associated with climate change involve delaying or ignoring 
necessary action. Using theorizing of  “risk society” from Ulrich Beck and others, this 
thesis examines how countries, environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and business interests construct the risk of climate change and how their 
respective discourses conflict in international environmental negotiations. This research 
uses computer-assisted qualitative data analysis to explore statements submitted by 
each of these constituencies to the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) for the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2010. 
Analysis of these texts identifies climate change discourse as crisis or opportunity, in 
addition to discourses of development, environmentalism, and rights or responsibilities 
to provide us a better understanding of how we perceive and respond to ecological risk.  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is the most persistent threat to global stability of this century. Its 
impacts are felt worldwide – from rising sea levels to more extreme weather conditions. 
While climate change poses an unprecedented risk to human security and future 
generations, our actions to mitigate and adapt to (or ignore) these documented adverse 
impacts of climate change vary greatly among countries and their constituencies. 
Despite mounting evidence detailing the economic, social, and ecological risks of 
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014; Stern, 
2006; Gosling et al., 2011) many “experts agree that the greatest risk associated with 
climate change is pretending that the problem does not exist, or that it does not require 
our immediate attention and action” (Mills, 2012, p. 67).  
This thesis asks whether explanations for such divergent responses to climate 
change could lie in analyzing risk perceptions, which influence our orientation and 
actions toward these global hazards (Beck, Block, Tyfield & Zhang, 2013; Leiserowitz, 
2006; O’Connor, Bord & Fisher, 1999; Welsh, 1996; Wood & Vedlitz, 2007). Indeed, 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck assumed “risk leads a dubious, insidious, would-be, 
allusive existence: it is existent and non-existent, present and absent, doubtful and 
suspect” (2009, p. 188). For Beck (2009), risk became “the central way of constituting 
and organizing society” as we moved toward modernity (p. 160). Equally, for many 
environmental scholars, risk has offered an ontological framework for studying social 
processes, cultural attitudes, and policymaking related to climate change. That is 
because risk does not standalone; it is a socially constructed phenomena linked to 
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governance and discourse (Beck, 2010a; Rothe, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 2000). As 
such, “risk issues are defined in the public sphere by the contest of contending forces” 
(McGuigan, 2006, p. 215).  
This thesis contains six chapters, the first of which gives an overview of the 
paper’s structure. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on construction and perception 
of risk as it relates to environmental issues. Chapter 3 offers background on the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which this thesis 
argues is one of the best arenas to study risk perceptions of climate change. In its 23-
year history, the UNFCCC has established a legitimate international regime through 
numerous formal and informal negotiations to implement transnational agreements 
aimed at mitigating or adapting to the risks of climate change (Huang, 2009). Together 
with hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the UNFCCC involves nearly 
200 countries meeting annually to “cooperatively consider what they could do to limit 
average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to cope 
with whatever impacts were, by then, inevitable” (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2013). Chapter 4 provides a discussion of 
the methodology utilized to examine documents submitted from UNFCCC 
constituencies – countries and NGOs – during the Conference of the Parties (COP) 16 
in 2010. Through discourse analysis of these high-level statements and submissions 
from these constituencies in 2010, this thesis seeks to identify the risk perceptions of 
countries and other key stakeholders in environmental negotiations aimed at curbing the 
threats associated with climate change. Chapter 5 offers an analysis of the findings from 
my computer-assisted data qualitative analysis of these documents to the UNFCCC 
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from countries and NGOs, and Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of what we can 
learn from studying climate change risk perceptions. 
1.1 Risk Society 
Although the concepts of loss and damage associated with climate change 
hazards are widely discussed, they are not clearly defined under the UNFCCC 
(Surminski, Lopez, Birkmann, & Welle, 2012). In addition, “no comprehensive risk 
assessment model for climate change loss and damage exists” (Surminski et al., 2012, 
p. 3). Without such models, it is difficult for decision makers to understand capacity 
needs, identify gaps, enhance action, or reduce vulnerability in their home countries. 
Thus, stakeholders often rely on risk perceptions to help inform their intentions. Beck 
famously argued that risk is a key aspect of late modernity, and our responses to risk 
change over time (Bristow & Fitzgerald, 2011). Countries have developed a variety of 
coping mechanisms to confront the risks that have evolved from industrialization and 
modernization, according to Beck (Rothe 2011). But climate change has exceeded the 
limits of national risk-management institutions, prompting a new risk society that must 
“transcend the boundaries of national states and thus open up a window of opportunity 
for a more cooperative international order to evolve” (Rothe, 2011, p. 332).  
Beck’s work offers a conceptual starting point from which to examine questions 
about contemporary environmental risk (Bulkeley, 2001). Yet, in this thesis, his 
theorizing is supplemented with that of Rothe (2011) and Webb (2011) who also explore 
the political impacts of different risk framing on global climate governance and the role 
of countries and NGOs, as well as theories on the social amplification of risk by 
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Kasperson et al. (1988). Additionally, this chapter reviews literature on the role of 
science in risk assessment and climate policy and explores the paradoxically 
democratizing and disproportionate effects of climate change – that is, while adverse 
impacts are seen worldwide, some places and peoples are suffering more than others 
(Beck, 2010b; Bulkeley, 2001; Huang, 2009). Closely linked to the inequity of climate 
change impacts are public perceptions of risk that guide norms of responsibility and 
accountability associated in responding to these hazards (Harris & Symons, 2010). This 
thesis also reviews past studies of public perception of the risks associated with climate 
change. 
1.1.1 Competing Interests 
As a “community of danger” coming together, Beck (2001) believed the United 
Nations (UN) could collectively address climate change risks and take more effective 
action than individual countries alone. Also critical to Beck’s theorizing of reflexive 
modernity is that participation in the UNFCCC is not limited to countries: in recent years, 
there has been a dramatic increase in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
attending and influencing the negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2001; Betsill & Corell, 2008; 
Cabré, 2011; Lund, 2012; Schroeder & Lovell, 2012; Steffek & Nanz, 2008). Among the 
most active and influential of these organizations are environmental NGOs – dubbed 
ENGOs – and business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) (Betsill & Corell, 2008; Lund, 
2012). Each nation and NGO grouping are permitted to submit high-level statements 
and opinions on COP decisions and strategies related to climate financing and 
adaptation, or other issues of negotiation. This research draws from these statements 
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and written opinions presented in 2010 prior to and during the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) 16, held in Cancún, Mexico.  
The UNFCCC has played a critical role by “catalyzing climate action at various 
levels of governance, building an institutional infrastructure, facilitating learning and 
enhancing trust among parties, and generally keeping climate change on the 
international policy agenda” (Moncel & van Asselt, 2012, p. 163). While Chapter 3 
reviews several of the recent cited successes of the UNFCCC – the Cancún 
Agreements and Durban Platform for Enhanced Action – this chapter also explores the 
UNFCCC’s failure to pass a binding resolution in Copenhagen and the challenges 
inherent to climate negotiations as they relate to politics, economy, equity, and process 
(Streck, 2012). As Cronin (2002) points out: “The UN is an organization of, by, and for 
independent sovereign states, yet it is also a semi independent actor staffed with a semi 
autonomous civil service” (p. 54). Borne (2010) says this assessment leads to “two 
faces of the UN” – one that involves nations pursuing their own interests, and the other 
a single entity searching for multilateral agreement (p. 34). This chapter explores those 
competing interests in their construction of risk.  
Yet countries are not the only actors with prominent influence at the UNFCCC. 
The number of observer organizations – non-governmental groups – has outnumbered 
delegates at a majority of COP meetings, and many national delegations also admit 
NGO, municipal, or business representatives into their delegations, raising that number 
even further (Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). In addition to energizing the negotiations with 
side-events, demonstrations, and media attention, NGOs provide much-needed 
technical expertise and leadership (Burleson & Wu, 2011; O’Brien, Hayward, & Berkes, 
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2009; Steffek & Nanz, 2008; Tully, 2005). Chapter 3 also reviews the history and 
relationship between NGO access and influence in international negotiations, with 
particular attention to ENGOs and BINGOs.  
While ENGOs, such as the Climate Action Network (CAN), have maintained fairly 
consistent framing of the urgency for international action to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change, business groups have struggled with conflicting, and sometimes, 
incoherent messaging. Tully (2005) notes that companies that stood to lose most, at 
least in the short term, such as fossil fuel corporations, have been among the loudest 
and most influential in the UNFCCC since its beginning. Yet with the growth of 
alternative and lower-emissions energy sectors, these fossil fuel companies no longer 
reflect the private sector at negotiations and prevent this constituency from acting as a 
cohesive bloc (Tully, 2005). This later section examines these business groups’ 
changing perceptions of risk as it relates to their economic interests. 
1.2 Climate Change Discourse 
The articulation or framing of an environmental problem – be it climate change, 
pollution, or biodiversity loss – shapes if and how that problem is addressed (Feindt & 
Oels, 2005). As such, a discursive perspective allows us to understand how the natural 
world is “produced” through environmental policymaking and planning (Feindt & Oels, 
2005, p. 163). Utilizing discourse analysis with about 150 UNFCCC documents allowed 
me to explore whether the statements and policy positions were about climate change 
(its risks and adverse effects) or about the nature of power in response to this threat. 
With the computer-assisted data analysis software MAXQDA, I was able to upload my 
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data and apply open coding to pull out themes from the documents. From these codes, I 
discovered risk discourse of crisis and survival, while at the same time multiple 
instances of framing climate change as an opportunity and a development conflict. 
Several discursive themes suggested how these countries and NGOs perceived the 
risks of climate change in larger contexts of global development, economic growth, and 
social equity, and how these perceptions influenced their discursive responses to 
environmental hazards.  
1.2.1 Predicted Findings 
Prior to coding my dataset, I hypothesized several findings for the three 
UNFCCC constituencies based upon my literature review. I predicted that countries, as 
the largest constituency, would have the greatest variation of risk discourse, with those 
most at risk or already suffering from climate change impacts, such as Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), citing the most 
frequent discourse of risk and danger associated with environmental change. Based 
upon a growing literature of climate security and security culture (Trombetta, 2008), I 
hypothesized that many countries would articulate ecological issues as national security 
risks to elevate a perception of concern and urgency to respond. I also assumed that a 
majority of countries would characterize climate change as a dangerous risk, with the 
exception of rapidly emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as 
oil-producing nations belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Instead, I predicted these countries would attempt to minimize the 
8 
 
impacts of climate change and scientific evidence for environmental changes in their 
high-level statements to maintain their development and economic interests.  
Additionally, I hypothesized that unlike the OPEC nations and those with rapidly 
emerging economies, the environmental groups would provide the most aggressive 
discourse of climate change as dangerous risk in their high-level statements and 
submissions to the COP. I anticipated I would find imagery and framing of climate 
change as a risk, threat, or struggle in every submission (and was surprised to find that 
not the case, as is further described in Chapter 5). In line with Beck’s theorizing of the 
rise of subpolitical actors approaching reflexive modernity, I also hypothesized that 
these environmental groups would seek to work beyond the international climate regime 
and the state for solutions to the climate crisis. I hypothesized that these groups would 
clash with business interests, which I predicted would either dispute the validity of 
climate change or would downplay its impacts as problems that would or could happen 
in the distant future, not the present. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
More than 100 countries have now accepted a 2-degree Celsius limit for global-
mean temperature rise to avoid “dangerous climate change” through a combination of 
mitigation and adaptation practices (Gosling et al., 2011, p. 444). This non-binding 
agreement of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord was heralded as a symbolic step forward, 
“albeit a small one towards a global climate change architecture”1 (The Climate Group, 
2010, p. 11). But what does avoiding “dangerous climate change” mean, and how do we 
characterize the risk that the world faces from rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? 
When the UNFCCC was charged with the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” it left this concept ambiguous 
(United Nations, 1992). Indeed, Risbey (2006) calls the term “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference” a “placeholder for the UNFCCC by effectively signaling to the broader 
community the notion that climate change can be dangerous at some level” and “policy 
measures can be used to try to prevent greenhouse gas concentrations from reaching 
dangerous levels” (p. 527).  
In 1999, the chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
said it was no longer a question if the Earth’s climate would change, but rather when, 
where, and by how much (Watson, 1999).  Amidst confusion over the uncertainty of 
climate change’s effects also lies misunderstanding of which regions could possibly 
                                            
1
 European Union (EU) member states appeared divided in their interpretations of the outcome of COP 
15. This quote comes from German Chancellor Angela Merkel; while the Swedish EU Presidency called 
the Copenhagen Accord “a disaster.” 
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benefit from warmer temperatures and changing weather patterns and which would 
suffer greater fates. 
The concept of risk, then, becomes critical to our understanding of “dangerous 
climate change” and our framing of what it means for society. Turnheim and Tezcan 
(2009) employ the definition of risk offered by the International Risk Governance 
Council (IRGC):  
Risk is understood as ‘an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with 
respect to something that humans value.’ It always refers to a combination of two 
things: ‘the likelihood or change of potential consequences and the severity of 
consequences of human activities, natural events or a combination of both.’ (p. 
518) 
Kane and Shogren (2000) contend that risk frameworks acknowledge peoples’ 
decisions to routinely act and react to risk, generally through an investment of resources 
and self-assurance of future wellbeing. Kasperson et al. (1988) differentiate between 
the technical concept of risk and risk perceptions as the product of intuitive biases and 
cultural values. But how is risk constructed? And how does it affect attitudes toward 
climate change? 
2.1 Creating a Society of Risk 
For Beck (2001), risk is socially constructed and evolves over time. Indeed, Beck 
(1997) argued, modern environmental risks are the result of humans’ activity: 
Whether we think of the ozone hole or toxins in the air and food, whether we 
recall the consequences of genetic engineering or human genetic research, the 
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picture is the same everywhere: nature has been changed, designed and 
endangered by human activity. One expression of this distinction is that today we 
no longer fear nature, but rather what we are inflicting on it. (p. 21) 
Beck and Giddens called these self-imposed threats to society “manufactured 
uncertainties” – the result of nature becoming more industrialized and concern over 
unrealized attempts to control it (Beck, 1997, p. 23). People have always been subject 
to risk, but Giddens observed that “modern ‘risk societies’ generate ‘manufactured 
risks,’ such as those associated with pollution, new illnesses and crime, which are the 
result of the modernization process itself and are marked by a high level of human 
agency” (Deere-Birkbeck, 2009, p. 1177). Beck argued these new risks resulted from 
our transition from first to second modernity, wherein society initially was centered on 
the state and was concerned with controlling industrialization’s relatively predictable 
side effects and distribution of “social goods” (Bristow & Fitzgerald, 2011). Yet 
industrialization eventually gave rise to a second modernity, focused less on the role of 
states and characterized by concern over the distribution of “social bads” resulting from 
the unpredictability and uncertainty of a growing number of global risks (Bristow & 
Fitzgerald, 2011).  
The causes of climate change, then, lie deep within modernity, and they are side 
effects of modernization (Bulkeley, 2001). While these risks are produced in modernity, 
their unpredictable nature means that they cannot be comprehended or managed within 
the modern era’s existing structures (Bulkeley, 2001). Because of this, Beck argued that 
a process of reflexivity would arise – a division between traditional state institutions of 
accountability and control and a “subpolitical realm,” beyond the political systems of 
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states, which would grow in power and influence (Bulkeley, 2001). This process is 
represented in Figure 1 below and described by Bulkeley (2001): 
From this morass of evolving ideas, three key points concerning the political 
possibilities of contemporary risk emerge: first, that the politics of risk society are 
not conducted only, or primarily, through the formal political system; second, that 
in light of risk society, the formal political system is weakened; third, that it is 
within subpolitics that conflicts of accountability will be resolved or ignored. (p. 
434). 
 
Figure 1: Risk society and reflexive modernity, adapted from Bulkeley (2001) 
 
Risk society ultimately refers to a society that has integrated the notion of risk 
and organizes itself in response to the perception of such threats (Beck, 1992). Borne 
(2010) says such a society is “defined by the distribution of hazards, scientific 
ambiguity, and the opening up of governance processes to wider sectors of society” (p. 
30). Indeed, Beck has argued that the transnational threat of climate change has 
comopolitanized society – creating a new type of community that is not so much formed 
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through face-to-face encounters, but rather though living and struggling with shared 
experiences. Pushing for cosmopolitan theory as transformative social theory, Beck, 
Blok, Tyfield, and Zhang (2013) suggested that cooperative political action and 
community-building are only made possible by the perceived “globality of risk” that 
allows opportunities for national and transnational actors to work together in new ways 
(p. 6). The UN is one example of this, Beck (2001) argued, because it brings together 
“communities of danger” that involve subpolitical actors at all different scales, as well as 
countries (p. 47). Citing the growing involvement of NGOs in climate negotiations, Beck 
et al. (2013) believed these “grassroots environmentalist communities [would] establish 
themselves as agents of cosmopolitization, seeking to hold powerful economic and 
political actors accountable to emerging shared norms” (p. 18).  
Still, Beck’s optimistic assertions of reflexive modernity’s outcomes have yet to 
be proven. Bulkeley (2001) argued that the “prevalence of economic considerations” in 
international environmental negotiations suggest that Beck’s conceptualization of risk 
society is “too narrow, and that the relations of production [remain] central to the politics 
of risk” (p. 439). Rather than Beck’s proposed transition toward cosmopolitanism, 
environmental negotiations today remain stymied by “status-quo” political structures and 
economic self-interest, despite the growing network of new, legitimate actors at the 
table. Such is the view propagated by anti-reflexivists, whom McCright and Dunlap 
(2010) characterized as political conservatives attempting to protect the “industrial 
capitalist order of simple modernization” by blocking both impact science and 
environmental social movements – both traits of reflexive modernization. By 
misrepresenting climate research and creating their own anti-environmental think tanks, 
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these anti-reflexive forces have helped suppress scientific results, stall progressive 
policymaking, and manipulate media biases in environmental reporting.2 
Despite challenges to the empirical validity’s of Beck’s thesis (Mythen, 2007; 
Pidgeon & Butler, 2009), his contributions have offered thought-provoking reflections on 
the construction of risk in the modern age. Mythen (2007) called Beck’s thesis a “bold 
but imperfect master narrative” (p. 807). Indeed, Beck’s greatest contribution may be his 
assertion that risk is not isolated from society. As Hulme (2009) rightly stated, climate 
change is not only altering the physical world, but the idea of climate change also is 
transforming our social worlds. Consequently, material climate change is nothing more 
than a change in the physical parameters of the Earth’s atmosphere, Rothe (2011) 
concluded. But when we define its ontological status and its perceivable harm to 
humans, it is one of the greatest risks of our time.  
Consistent with Beck’s theorizing of the relationship between risk and society, 
Kasperson et al. (1988) explained the construction of risk through their social 
amplification framework “integrating the technical analysis of risk and the cultural, 
social, and individual response structures that shape the public perception of risk” (p. 
178). As such, risk events – environmental or otherwise – interact with our 
psychological and social processes in ways that can either amplify or attenuate public 
perception of the risk and related behavior (Ibid.). At the same time that attenuation of 
risks allows people to cope with the multitude of risks and events they encounter daily, 
“it also may lead to potentially serious adverse consequences from underestimation and 
                                            
2 See McCright and Dunlap (2010) for further analysis and evidence of anti-environmentalists 
misrepresenting and manipulating climate change research results. 
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underresponse” (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 178), confounding conventional risk analysis 
and assessment. 
2.2 The Science of Climate Risk 
The role of science remains critical to constructing and responding to climate 
change risks. Beck (1992) wrote that “risk consciousness is neither a traditional or lay 
person’s consciousness, but is essentially determined by and oriented to science” (p. 
72). Yet even Beck warned about a clash of expert knowledge in the face of global risks 
that would render science unreliable:  
Science has been transformed from a source of security into a source of reflexive 
insecurity…Experts can never provide anything but more or less uncertain 
knowledge and information on the probabilities of events; they cannot answer the 
question as to whether a risk is still acceptable or not. (p. 23) 
Since the 1970s, people, particularly in the West, have become progressively 
disenchanted with the failure of such expert systems to effectively contain and deflect 
these growing risks (Mythen, 2007). Climate science has always acknowledged 
complex uncertainty in its predictive models (Oppenheimer, 2005). And until recently, 
even the world’s foremost expert body on climate change science, the IPCC, avoided 
overt risk-based predictions (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009). As early as 2001, the IPCC 
assessments used narrative-based scenarios for describing future uncertainties; while 
the 2007 4th Assessment Report (AR4) and 2014 5th Assessment Report (AR5) 
summaries provide more explicit probability expressions (“virtually certain,” “extremely 
likely,” “very high confidence,” etc.) to explain evidence for a variety of adverse climate 
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change impacts. Risk characterization, thus, involves “collecting and summarizing all 
relevant evidence necessary for making an informed choice on tolerability or 
acceptability of the risk in question and suggesting potential options for dealing with the 
risk from a scientific perspective” (Turnheim & Tezcan, 2009, p. 523). Article 4.1 of the 
UNFCCC recognizes the role that scientific evidence plays in monitoring, mitigating, and 
adapting to climate change, when it tells parties to: 
Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and 
other research, systematic observation and development of data archives related 
to the climate system and intended to further the understanding and to reduce 
and eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, 
magnitude and timing of climate change and the economic and social 
consequences of various response strategies. (UN, 1992, Art. 4.1.g) 
Within the UNFCCC, the creation of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) to assist the COP in its agreement brokerage and 
decisions drafting further institutionalized the role of science in the international climate 
regime (Turnheim & Tezcan, 2009). 
2.2.1 Politicizing Risk 
At this point, it is worth noting the difference between risk and uncertainty, which 
Knight (1921) distinguished as estimates based upon random events that have known 
probabilities derived from past occurrences (risk), versus random events with unknown 
probabilities that cannot be quantified (uncertainty). Indeed, there is concern among the 
scientific community in the inherent uncertainty of climate change modeling (Gosling et 
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al., 2011). Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, and Hulme (2003) argued that “quantifying this 
uncertainty has been the subject of the greatest efforts among climate scientists, 
teasing out how much is due to our inability to model precisely…and how much is due 
to our inability to foresee” (p. 184). Instead, uncertainty has been recast into a growing 
field of risk assessment, predominantly defined by experts whom Power (2007) 
characterizes as part of a rapidly increasing “risk industry” that converts scientific 
uncertainty into measurable and probabilistic risk (Clarke, 1999; Webb, 2011). The 
significant uncertainties over the likely distribution and timing of climate change impacts 
mean that attempts to frame or set boundaries around what is considered relevant are 
ultimately controversial (Webb, 2011). Because of these knowledge gaps, risk is 
constructed alongside social values and political priorities of global climate change.  
Rather than simply reporting evidence, Webb (2011) argued that risk 
assessments might shape our use of knowledge with the potential to mold behavior. If 
that is the case, science has “become politicized and drawn into policy formation” 
(Eden, 1996, p. 189). As such, risk has become embedded into broader political 
rationalities with dueling perceptions on global climate governance (Rothe, 2011). 
Hansen (2007) even characterized this politicization as “scientific reticence,” where 
scientists would anticipate likely government reactions to evidence of incalculable 
climate change risks and manage evidence in ways that would avoid major disruption to 
policy agendas or enable easier assimilation into existing bureaucracies (Webb, 2011). 
For Kane and Shogren (2000), constructing climate risk is as much about weighing 
economic factors as it is about scientific evidence.  To this claim, Murphy and Murphy 
(2012) cite a trend toward economically attractive framing and solutions of climate 
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change, particularly from countries with significant economic dependence on fossil fuel. 
That is because they claim “cultural values shape whether scientific findings of risk lead 
to concern, denial, or apathy, and hence to changes in practices or their continuation” 
(Murphy & Murphy, 2012, p. 248). 
One result of politicizing risk is conflicting discourses on the dangers of climate 
change. In analyzing 100 newspaper articles in the United States and Germany and 20 
speeches given during the UN Summit on Climate Change in New York in 2009 and the 
UNFCCC COP 15 in Copenhagen that same year, Rothe (2011) found that “conceptual 
vocabulary of the climate discourse is used by actors with different subject positions to 
promote different risk storylines for the sake of political argumentation” (p. 335). In other 
words, our risk construction of climate change is rather fragmented and 
multidimensional. Still, despite this evidence for diverse framings of these threats, 
scholars point to an emerging global awareness of the risk of climate change. And many 
cite the coming together of transnational parties in the framework of the UNFCCC as a 
major institutional step toward dealing with the problem of climate change at a global 
level. Indeed, Evans and Steven (2008) claim that the role of scientific institutions, with 
rallying support by the IPCC, has institutionalized the connection between climate 
scientists and the international community, contributed to aligning high-level 
perspectives of the risks and problems of climate change and has helped bring together 
governments, civil society, and businesses. The next section examines who has been 
included in the framing of these risks and their solutions. 
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2.3 Climate Change Inequities 
Climate change risks pose a paradox. They are simultaneously democratizing 
and hierarchical, said Beck (2010a), who argued like many that “climate change 
exacerbates existing inequalities of poor and rich, center and periphery” (p. 175). But 
their global nature and growing threat ensures that even the wealthiest and most 
powerful will not avoid impacts. Beck called this the “boomerang effect,” wherein 
developed countries (whose actions ultimately created such risks) would also 
experience damage from changing climate patterns, albeit at a delayed rate compared 
with developing countries. That is because the impacts of climate change are not evenly 
distributed, often with people exposed to the most immediate and worse of the impacts 
also the least able to cope with these risks (Adger et al., 2003; Beck, 2010a; Deere-
Birkbeck, 2009; Paavola & Adger, 2006; Yamin, 2005).  
The IPCC has consistently asserted that the impacts of climate change will 
disproportionately fall on developing countries and their poorest, most vulnerable 
citizens (Pachauri, 2004; Yamin, 2005). These are nations that typically have low per 
capita GHG emissions and consequently minimal responsibility for causing climate 
change (Harris & Symons, 2010). As such, the costs of climate change are unfairly 
distributed, both among countries and in time (Hale, 2010). Curiously, some have even 
suggested that countries might benefit from climate change and ecological crises, which 
is further explored in the next chapter. Beck (2010b) offered the example of Russia 
because of its large reserves of fossil fuels and warmer temperatures that would allow it 
to expand agriculture in Siberia.  
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Still, like risk, the concept of vulnerability is socially constructed. Vulnerability is 
influenced by institutional and economic dynamics, and the vulnerability of a system to 
climate change depends upon its exposure and ability or opportunity to adapt to change 
(Adger et al., 2003). Indeed, Beck (2010a) said social vulnerability has become a crucial 
element in his analysis of world risk society:  
Social processes and conditions produce an unequal exposure to hardly 
definable risks, and the resulting inequalities must largely be seen as an 
expression and product of power relations in the national and global context. (p. 
171) 
Ultimately, societal vulnerability to risks associated with climate change may 
exacerbate other ongoing social and economic challenges, particularly for those who 
remain dependent upon resources that are sensitive to climate change (Adger et al., 
2003; Deere-Birkbeck, 2009). Like a vicious cycle, that vulnerability to climate change is 
likely to further reinforce these inequalities on the global stage. In its 2015 listing of 
countries at risk from climate change, global risk analytics company Maplecroft ranked 
32 of 198 countries assessed at “extreme risk.” This listing, illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, 
shows that nearly all of the top 10 countries at extreme risk also are listed among the 
UNFCCC’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with the exception of Nigeria and the 
Philippines.3 
 
                                            
3 Nigeria and the Philippines belong to the Group of 77 (G77) made of about 130 developing countries 
generally working together to establish common negotiating positions. While LDCs continue to prioritize 
adaptation financing, key G77 countries – Brazil, China and India – are demanding a pledge-and-review-
based approach. See Evans (2013) for further analysis of these divergent views on financing, 
development and the climate regime. 
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Table 1: Climate Change Environmental Risk Atlas 2015: Top 10 countries at 
extreme risk, adapted from Maplecroft (2014) 
Rank                        Country Category 
1 Bangladesh Extreme 
2 Sierra Leone Extreme 
3 South Sudan Extreme 
3 Nigeria Extreme 
5 Chad Extreme 
6 Haiti Extreme 
7 Ethiopia Extreme 
8 Philippines Extreme 
9 Central African Republic Extreme 
9 Eritrea Extreme 
 
Table 2: Least Developed Countries as defined by the UNFCCC 
Country 
  Date of     
Inclusion Country 
Date of 
Inclusion 
1 Afghanistan 1971 25 Madagascar 1991 
2 Angola 1994 26 Malawi 1971 
3 Bangladesh 1975 27 Mali 1971 
4 Benin 1971 28 Mauritania 1986 
5 Bhutan 1971 29 Mozambique 1988 
6 Burkina Faso 1971 30 Myanmar 1987 
7 Burundi 1971 31 Nepal 1971 
8 Cambodia 1991 32 Niger 1971 
9 
Central African 
Republic 
1975 33 Rwanda 1971 
10 Chad 1971 34 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1982 
11 Comoros 1977 35 Senegal 2000 
12 
Dem. Rep of the 
Congo 
1991 36 Sierra Leone 1982 
13 Djibouti 1982 37 Solomon Islands 1991 
14 Equatorial Guinea 1982 38 Somalia 1971 
15 Eritrea 1994 39 South Sudan 2012 
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Country 
  Date of     
Inclusion Country 
Date of 
Inclusion 
16 Ethiopia 1971 40 Sudan 1971 
17 Gambia 1975 41 Timor-Leste 2003 
18 Guinea 1971 42 Togo 1982 
19 Guinea-Bissau 1981 43 Tuvalu 1986 
20 Haiti 1971 44 Uganda 1971 
21 Kiribati 1986 45 
United Rep. of 
Tanzania 
1971 
22 
Lao People's 
Dem. Republic 
1971 46 Vanuatu 1985 
23 Lesotho 1971 47 Yemen 1971 
24 Liberia 1990 48 Zambia 1991 
 
2.3.1 Climate Justice 
A growing literature of climate justice explores the inequities caused by 
environmental risks, often positioning this dialogue between the countries of the global 
North and South. Huang (2009) rightly stated that despite growing awareness for action 
on climate change, there is substantial divergence between the developed North and 
developing South on how to approach these risks. These differences are not simply 
varying perspectives, but rather result from substantial conflicts of interest between the 
North and South in matters of socioeconomic development (Huang, 2009). Simply put, 
fast-developing countries of the South do not intend to hinder their efforts toward 
industrialization or modernization despite a rise in GHG emissions. Neither China nor 
India, as example, will agree to an international approach that constrains their economic 
development (Beck, 2010b). Huang (2009) added that these countries also assert a 
need for the North to shoulder the major responsibility in mitigating climate change 
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because of their “lion’s share in energy consumption” and emissions from their own 
industrialization (p. 435). Beck (2010a) further explained this dichotomy: 
The 900 million people privileged by the grace of birth in the west are responsible 
for 86 per cent of world consumption; they use 58 per cent of its energy supplies 
and have 79 per cent of world income at their disposal as well as 74 per cent of 
all telephone connections. The poorest 1.2 billion, one-fifth of the world’s 
population are responsible for 1.3 per cent of world consumption, use 4 percent 
of its energy supplies and have 1.5 per cent of all telephone connections. (p. 
167) 
Ultimately, this disproportionality raises profound questions of fairness and 
responsibility. Do these major GHG emitters of the North have a special obligation to 
assist the developing South both in adapting to climate change and meeting their 
socioeconomic needs? Paavola and Adger (2006) framed these justice dilemmas in 
three questions: 1) What is the responsibility of developed countries for climate change 
impacts; 2) How much should developed countries give assistance to developing 
countries for adapting to climate change; and 3) How should the burden be distributed 
among developed countries? Deep divisions in the UNFCCC still exist over the extent to 
which developed countries should assist developing countries to adapt (Paavola & 
Adger, 2006). One argument against assistance claims responsibility cannot be 
established because climate change impacts cannot be traced to the specific actions or 
actors who caused them (Paavola & Adger, 2006). Yet, a recently released historical 
emissions study found that just 90 companies (fossil fuel and cement producers) have 
produced almost two-thirds of the GHG emissions since the industrial age began 
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(Heede, 2014). The study also noted that while current climate change is driven by 
historical emissions, “the parties responsible for the dominant sources of historical 
emissions are not necessarily the same as those responsible for the dominant share of 
current emissions” (Heede, 2014, p. 229). What role, then, should historical emissions 
play in contemporary discussions of climate change assistance? The UNFCCC does 
not overlook questions of responsibility and states that the impacts of climate change 
will be felt unevenly among countries. Its text refers to “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities” (UN, 1992, Art. 3.1). It also acknowledges the 
need to take into account “differences in these Parties’ [Annex 1] starting points and 
approaches, economic structures and resources bases” (UN, 1992, Art. 4.2c). Still, 
crucial gaps remain, as the regime does not determine how much assistance should be 
made to developing countries and how the North should share the burden of assistance, 
and who should be held accountable for emissions over what timeframe (Paavola & 
Adger, 2006; Heede, 2014).  
Among the most-cited vulnerable nations in international environmental 
negotiations are the small island states, which often suffer a combination of 
geographical, social and economic inequities related to climate change. Specifically the 
countries of Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, the Maldives, and Kiribati have caught the 
attention of the IPCC, which characterizes their unique vulnerability to climate change 
due to small physical size, limited natural resources, relative isolation, proneness to 
natural disasters, and poorly developed infrastructure (Cameron, 2011). Yet Adger, 
Barnett, Chapin, and Ellemor (2011) also noted the potential negative cultural and 
nonmaterial impacts of climate change that are not as easily summarized in economic 
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terms. While metrics have been developed to assess the market costs, human lives 
lost, distributional affects, changes to quality of life, and people displaced, they do not 
address what level of loss is acceptable or fair (Adger et al., 2011). And they do not take 
into account the value of traditional ecological knowledge, for which many of these 
communities have utilized to adapt to their changing environments. The climate change 
risks and framing specific to small island states will be examined in later chapters. 
Ultimately, these communities represent the major climate justice concerns in the fight 
against climate change on the international stage. 
2.4 Public Risk Perceptions 
It is no surprise that public support or opposition to climate policies are greatly 
influenced by public perceptions of risk and the dangers of global climate change 
(Leiserowitz, 2006). As example, Slovic (2000) cited research that found peoples’ 
perceptions are influenced not only by scientific and technical descriptions of danger, 
but also by a number of social and psychological factors, including affect and emotion, 
trust, values, world views, and personal experiences – dimensions of risk perception 
that rarely are explored in public opinion polls. Yet, Thompson and Rayner (2000) have 
argued that these public perceptions must be included in the assessment of risks. Most 
theorists have assumed that decision-making about risk is essentially a cognitive activity 
(Leiserowitz, 2006) – but not one that generally can be swayed simply by providing 
more detailed and accurate information to correct misconceptions or alleviate fears 
(O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999). Kempton, Boster, and Hartley (1995) discovered that 
Americans had already assimilated information on climate change into pre-existing 
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mental models of stratospheric ozone depletion and the ozone hole. As such, they 
mistakenly believed that banning aerosol spray cans could solve climate change. Wood 
and Vedlitz (2007) asserted that individuals generally lack the time, cognitive skill and 
resources to correctly interpret information, and thus engage in what Herbert Simon 
called “satisficing,” or processing information through a filter of past assessments and 
ideology. The result is often misconstrued and contradictory perceptions of climate 
change risks and policies. For example, Leiserowitz’s found that “Americans expressed 
moderate levels of concern about [climate change]” and “strongly supported national 
regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant,” while at the same time opposing increases 
in energy business and gasoline taxes (2006, p. 56). Leiserowitz’s findings differ from 
Slovic’s earlier research employing a psychometric paradigm; he found that people 
tended to view current risk levels as unacceptably high for most activities (Slovic, 1987). 
From this, he noted that “the gap between perceived and desired risk levels suggests 
that people are not satisfied with the way that market and other regulatory mechanisms 
have balanced risks and benefits” (Slovic, 1987, p. 283).  
To that end, O’Connor et al. (1999) cited the complexities among peoples’ risk 
perceptions of climate change. They are neither “‘nonbelievers’ who will take no 
initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they ‘believers’ who 
promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that 
promises to address climate change” (p. 461). Most people relate to climate change 
through their personal experiences, while failing to take larger public values and global 
views into consideration. This cognitive balance between short- and long-term needs is 
problematic for risk communication, said Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006), whose 
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research on public views of climate change in the United States and Europe concluded 
climate change was of secondary concern to peoples’ everyday lives. For those whom 
climate change is not an immediate concern, Nisbet (2009) offered issue framing as 
shortcuts for defining the risks of climate change. Several of those frames are detailed 
in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Typology of climate change frames, adapted from Nisbet (2009) 
Frame Defines climate change issues as… 
Scientific and technical 
uncertainty 
A debate over what is known versus 
unknown; a matter of expert understanding or 
consensus versus hype or alarmism 
Morality and ethics 
A matter of right and wrong; respect or 
disrespect for thresholds, limits or boundaries 
Economic development and 
opportunity 
An economic investment; market benefit or 
risk; a point of local, national or global 
competitiveness 
Pandora's box/Frankenstein's 
monster 
A need for precaution or action in face of 
possible catastrophe or out-of-control 
consequences; fatalism with no way to avoid 
the chosen path 
A battle to overcome 
A struggle or fight that must be won; combat 
against an enemy 
Social progress 
A means of improving quality of life; 
alternative interpretation as a way of being in 
harmony with nature as opposed to mastering 
it 
 
Nisbet (2009) argued that this framing strategy was critical in creating public perception 
and understanding of the climate change problem, and in framing our responses to it. 
Further discussion of climate change framing is addressed in later sections on 
discourse and this thesis’ methodology.
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CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND 
Since 1992, the UNFCCC has played a vital role in addressing climate change. 
Hilde (2012) credits the UNFCCC with successfully promoting global awareness of the 
issues, generating normative obligations toward tackling these ecological risks and 
acting as a clearing house for research and information, as well as an intermediary for 
large-scale financing. Negotiating solutions to climate change arguably are the most 
complicated challenges our international community faces today; and while the 
UNFCCC sets direction and defines many of the tools and mechanisms needed, “it 
does not provide any clear strategy on how to solve the climate crisis” (Streck, 2012, p. 
52). Its three pillars – shared vision, accountability in action, and assisting developing 
countries in combating climate change – have produced numerous commitments toward 
financing and emissions reduction (Streck, 2012), many of which are outlined below in 
Table 4, which is based upon the UNFCCC’s own listed accomplishments. Even so, the 
UNFCCC has yet to achieve a comprehensive, binding solution. Still, this transnational 
climate regime does offer an international political, economic, and social network from 
which to examine global risk perceptions among key constituencies. And, it offers an 
arena in which to test Beck’s theory of risk society and the rise of reflexive modernity to 
address these new global hazards, such as climate change. 
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Table 4: Major UNFCCC agreements from 2007-2011 
Key Steps 
COP 
Year 
Significant Actions  
Bali Action 
Plan 
2007 
Divided into five main categories: shared vision, 
mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing. 
Refers to a long-term vision for action on climate 
change, including a long-term goal for emission 
reductions.  
Copenhagen 
Accord 
2009 
Endorses the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and 
recognizes the increase in global temperature should 
be below 2-degrees Celsius. Agrees that developing 
countries should slow growth in emissions through 
mitigation actions. Establishes a Green Climate Fund 
to support developing countries' mitigation. Encourages 
countries to set emission reduction targets. 
Cancun 
Agreements 
2010 
Establishes clear goals and schedule for reducing 
human-generated GHG emissions to keep global 
average temperature rise below 2-degrees Celsius. 
Mobilizes the development and transfer of clean 
technology to boost efforts address climate change. 
Set up the Green Climate Fund to provide support to 
developing countries to assist them in mitigation and 
adaptation plans.  
Durban 
Outcomes 
2011 
Establishes a second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, where developed countries commit to GHG 
cuts and accounting rules. Launches a new platform of 
negotiations under the Convention to deliver a new and 
universal GHG reduction protocol with legal force by 
2015 for the period beyond 2020.  
 
While this thesis does not seek to analyze the legitimacy and governance of the 
UNFCCC, it is worth noting criticisms of its effectiveness and ability to adequately tackle 
such issues of international importance. To that end, Huang (2009) stated: 
Its mammoth size and lack of strong leadership has substantially constrained its 
effectiveness, making it virtually toothless in terms of implementation as well as 
decisionmaking. Despite marathon programs, most of the meetings of the 
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COP…appeared more symbolic than substantial, and the agreements achieved 
through exhausting negotiations are hardly abiding. (p. 438) 
While such criticism is certainly debatable, there is no denying that the UNFCCC has 
yet to meet the goal it set for itself – no matter how insurmountable it may seem at 
times. The UNFCCC’s primary agents are the countries that negotiate each year toward 
mitigation and adaptation plans for the impacts of climate change. These parties – as 
they are called – are responsible for taking the appropriate actions and measures 
related to their commitments (Turnheim & Tezcan, 2010). Article 4 of the Convention 
states that each of the Annex I parties (industrialized countries and those with 
economies in transition4) should “coordinate as appropriate with such other Parties, 
relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of 
the Convention” and shall “identify and periodically review its own policies and 
practices” (UN, 1992, art. 4.2.e). As such, parties are self- and peer-reviewed with 
respect to their actions and given the freedom to achieve a common goal (Turnheim & 
Tezcan, 2010). Within this arena, Beck argued that the risks associated with climate 
change should pave the way toward more cosmopolitan world politics. While it certainly 
has drawn countries together on an international stage, there also is great evidence that 
we are still very far apart. 
 Borne (2010) suggested that is because the UN has two faces: “one as a 
collection of the world’s nations pursuing their own narrow interests within a multilateral 
environment, and the other an entity in its own right” (p. 34). Together, these competing 
                                            
4 The UNFCCC defines Annex I countries as industrialized countries that were members of the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in 
transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States and several Central and Eastern European 
States. 
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forces make up a dynamic body – almost like a living system – “permeated by a myriad 
of flows that converge internally and are subsequently radiated outwards again towards 
wider society” (Borne, 2010, p. 34). As such, Strong (2003) viewed the UN as an arena 
of ideologies and values and forum for discussion and negotiations, rather than a “place 
of operations” (p. 117). Still, it is a forum with “two-level norms,” said Hilde (2012), who 
found that parties to the UNFCCC shared “basic norms regarding climate change,” but 
would still revert to national self-interest at the negotiating table (p. 894). To explain this, 
Hilde drew from Robert Putnam’s theory of “two-level games” – where countries 
negotiating on the international stage also are negotiating within their own borders with 
domestic governing bodies and economic interests. The result often produces great 
tension among parties, whose leaders superficially agree upon general norms of the 
Convention, but differ when negotiations are incompatible with a country’s 
domestication of those norms. Depledge (2005) stated this more clearly when observing 
strong tendency for competition over cooperation among negotiating parties: 
This is partly the result of the high political stakes of climate change, including 
concerns over national economic interests and competitiveness, as well as the 
long time horizon of the problem, which has led to a focus on short-term costs 
rather than on the benefits that would accrue in the future. The tendency to 
competitiveness is also a product of the North-South divide to the negotiations 
where the imperative of global cooperation struggles against a history of mistrust 
and differing perceptions of the problem. (p. 32) 
Figure 2 below illustrates the various UNFCCC party groupings in which 
countries tend to organize themselves in the international climate regime, generally due 
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to similar negotiating positions toward climate change and common socioeconomic 
conditions. Yet Evans (2013) noted these groupings may have further diverged in recent 
years, particularly among the emerging economies of the Group of 77 and the LDCs of 
the global South, with new political and economic leaders such as China, Brazil, and 
India shaping their own domestic and development policies.  
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of UNFCCC country groupings, adapted from Depledge 
(2005) 
 
Much also has been written about the neoliberal bias of UNFCCC negotiations, 
whose contemporary risk approaches tend to align more closely with political norms and 
rationalities of affluent Western democracies than those of other nations (Pidgeon & 
Butler, 2009). From the sheer numbers of parties and structure of these groups outlined 
in Figure 2, this should come as no surprise. Yet, it will be further examined during this 
paper’s analysis of risk discourses in the selected UNFCCC documents in the following 
chapters. 
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3.1 Non-State Actors on the International Stage 
Countries are not the only actors involved in these international negotiations. In 
recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of non-state actors 
attending the COP – added to the near-universal participation of countries (Schroeder & 
Lovell, 2012). Nearly 1,400 non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) had observer status under the UNFCCC at COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 
(Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). Today, the number of NGOs admitted to the UNFCCC is 
just under 1,600 – with another 100 IGOs – as observer organizations. The number of 
observers has almost always outnumbered party delegates at COP meetings, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, and many national parties also admit representatives from NGOs, 
cities, and businesses into their delegations, increasing their numbers even further. 
From 1995 to 2004, about 25 percent of national delegations at the COP incorporated 
NGO activists (Kruse, 2012).  
 
Figure 3: Numbers of parties and observers attending COP, 2007-2010 (UNFCCC, 
2015) 
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As such, Betsill and Corell (2008) noted that the UNFCCC involves a “myriad [of] 
actors representing a diversity of interests” – akin to an environmental mega-conference 
(p. 2). Within the official delegation process, NGOs are allowed to participate by 
observing the negotiations, accessing official documents, addressing party delegation 
leaders during plenary sessions, and distributing information and material to negotiators 
(Depledge, 2005). To date, it has been difficult to assess the influence that NGOs have 
on the international negotiations. Betsill and Corell (2001) have characterized their 
activities as “indirect strategies” – “developing and using informal relationships with 
state delegates, lurking in the corridors” and “even searching trash cans and copy 
machines in hopes of retrieving documents being worked on behind closed doors” (p. 
70). 
In spite of these less-than-glorious activities, the rise of these non-state actors 
arguably follows Beck’s thesis on world risk society and a kind of cosmopolitan 
disturbance of existing political order. Beck et al. (2013) described it as such: 
The order of the nation-state(s) is being disturbed, undermined and redefined, 
reimagined by the intervention and incorporation of human rights, NGOs, climate 
experts…With climate change, the nationally excluded ‘Other’ is in our midst; and 
national resources and jurisdictions have no answers to the cosmopolitan 
challenges that it raises. (p. 5) 
Of the UNFCCC’s nine recognized non-state constituencies, outlined in Table 5, 
this paper focuses the bulk of its analysis on the two largest UNFCCC civil society 
constituencies, ENGOs and BINGOs, while recognizing that many of the other 
constituencies – indigenous peoples groups (IPOs), farmers, women and gender and 
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youth (deemed YOUNGO by the UNFCCC) – also identify with environmental interests, 
and even the developing South. For the purposes of this thesis, groups from the 
Women and Gender, IPO, YOUNGO and Farmers’ constituencies, whose statements 
and submissions closely align (and even were co-submitted) with ENGOs, also will be 
included in the dataset of ENGO documents described in Chapter 4. A complete 
breakdown of these non-state groups is illustrated in Figure 4, with ENGOs and then 
BINGOs making up the largest non-state constituencies.  
 
Table 5: UNFCCC non-state constituencies (UNFCCC, 2015) 
Name Constituency Group Year Formalized 
BINGO Business and Industry Pre-1994 
ENGO Environmental Pre-1994 
LGMA 
Local Government and 
Municipal Authorities 
1995 
IPO Indigenous Peoples 2001 
RINGO Research and Independent 2003 
TUNGO Trade Union 2008 
Farmers Farmers and Agricultural 2014 
Women and Gender Women and Gender 2009 
YOUNGO Youth 2009 
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Figure 4: Illustration of NGO participant percentages, 2013 (UNFCCC, 2015) 
 
In its statement about UNFCCC participation, YOUNGO says, “As youths, the 
future is ours. Yet, actions today jeopardize the very world we will have [to] live in,” 
according to the constituency’s website, YouthClimate.org. Such vulnerable groups – 
youths, women and indigenous peoples – have long been marginalized and often 
excluded from making decisions on the public management of climate risks (Adger, 
2003). Through participation in the Convention, those most vulnerable have gained a 
voice and formal ability to hold governments accountable for their stated positions and 
resulting actions (Cameron, 2011; Deere-Birkbeck, 2009), embodying Beck’s theorizing 
of the rise of subpolitical actors influencing the state and status-quo institutions. In 
particular, scholars have paid special attention to small island states and the growing 
number of environmental NGOs supporting their efforts to generate awareness and 
mitigate or adapt to climate change. While environmental groups from industrialized 
countries often use small island nations as the “poster child” for the climate change 
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crisis, their efforts can sometimes be at odds with the nation’s government, or even its 
people. Cameron (2011) has labeled these competing metadiscourses in the 
governance of these islands – as civic environmentalism is aimed at “saving” the islands 
and their inhabitants, these groups are competing with localized neoliberal 
governmentalities also negotiating at the global scale. Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) also 
have criticized the incongruences of international ENGOs and small island states, even 
if their goals overlap. At question is Western groups’ framing of small island peoples as 
victim-commodities of climate change while pursuing environmental activities concerned 
with combatting the climate crisis (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). Yet these are not the only 
NGO interests whose actions are at odds. 
3.2 Business Interests in Environmental Negotiations 
Civil society at the UNFCCC represents organizations of every size – from the 
grassroots peoples’ movements of the global South to the world’s largest corporations. 
This section explores the evolving relationship that business organizations have had 
with the Convention. Despite their grouping in one of the larger NGO constituency – 
BINGOs – these industries do not present an entirely unified front, with subgroupings of 
agricultural, alternative energy, and fossil fuel interests seeking diverse solutions to the 
climate crisis (Fernandes & Girard, 2011). Not surprisingly, the private sector is a 
leading player in plans proposed in the international climate regime, largely driven by 
market mechanisms and economic interests. For Hale (2010), the growing power of 
transnational businesses and their ability to lay constraints on the actions of national 
governments, are features of our global economy. Business interests propagate a 
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dominating discourse, Lund (2012) argued, “which assumes the compatibility of 
economic growth and environmental protection” (p. 5).  
While BINGOs’ participation in the negotiations has been more turbulent than 
their ENGO counterparts (Tully, 2005), their structural advantages seem to have 
resulted in larger influence (Lund, 2012). For one, Tully (2005) argued that national or 
trade-specific industry groups have enjoyed close working relationships with state 
delegations. Not only valued for their technical knowledge to help shape what is 
technologically and economically feasible, BINGOs possess structural power over 
policymakers considering what broad economic impacts their proposals would have 
(Falkner, 2010). Because economic interests primarily drive governments, Orsini (2012) 
argued, business organizations can affect significant influence in negotiation outcomes. 
That same influence could be asserted over these groups’ shaping of climate change 
risk and discourse: 
By portraying the issue from a certain angle, highlighting some aspects, and 
shadowing others, industry actors attempt to influence how the society perceives 
the issue and how the political authorities respond to it. (Schlichting, 2013, p. 
294) 
Figure 5 illustrates the numerous channels of influence BINGOs employ at the 
UNFCCC. Direct lobbying has been cited as one of the most successful tactics – with 
one of the more active lobbyists inside the UN, the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, representing 200 of the biggest global companies whose 
combined worth is $7 trillion annually (Fernandes & Girard, 2011). Another organization, 
the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), a now-defunct industry group of fossil fuel interests, 
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advised the Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti and Russian governments to obstruct political 
deliberations and weaken the language of scientific reports (Tully, 2005). Business and 
corporate interests, consequently, have made an effort to build hegemonic coalitions of 
actors (countries and NGOs) with the ability to establish norms that can structure the 
regime in particular ways (Levy, 2005). This Gramscian approach illustrates how 
international environmental agreements are negotiated: “even the most powerful states 
[or groups] are generally unable to impose a particular agreement on the international 
community, though the may be able to block or delay for some time” (Levy, 2005, p. 75). 
 
 
Figure 5: BINGO channels of influence, adapted from Fernandes and Girard, 2011 
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Known for its outspoken and controversial stance on climate change, the GCC 
no longer represents international business interests at the UNFCCC. And some 
leading oil firms publically (at least) have taken a more conciliatory stance from when 
the UNFCCC was first established. Falkner (2010) cited British Petroleum’s American 
subsidiary’s withdrawal from the GCC in 1996, signaling a rift within the fossil fuel 
sector. Since then, Tully (2005) has cited the growing inconsistency of business 
messages about climate change risks: 
The companies that stand to lose the most – at least in the short term – have 
from the beginning been the most prominent and influential business voices in 
the climate negotiations…However, the fossil fuel sector is unrepresentative of 
the private sector generally…Since the business community is not homogeneous 
it may be unable to marshal coherent or uniform recommendations. (pp. 23-24) 
Similarly, Schlichting (2013) found in her longitudinal study of industrial climate 
change communication that corporations’ strategic framing of the environment has 
greatly changed from 1990 to 2010. Indeed, international business interests have 
shifted from questioning the science of climate change to portraying themselves as 
industrial leaders, thus influencing international dialogue: 
The automobile industry, for example, [now] promotes carbon-free electric 
vehicles… and conventional energy corporations cast themselves as ‘Green 
Energy Generator of the Year.’ (Schlichting, 2013, p. 494) 
Levy (2005) attributed this shift in perspectives to “changing competitive 
dynamics, the evolution of new organizations supportive of a proactive industry role, 
and the diffusion of ‘win-win’ discourse articulating the consonance of environmental 
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and business interests” (p. 74). Still, BINGOs today do represent a constituency of 
stakeholders with widely diverging views on climate change – from so-called “gray” 
businesses that oppose GHG emissions regulations to “green” businesses, which see 
climate mitigation and adaptation as an opportunity (de Sépibus, 2012). Indeed, a global 
business coalition launched in 2007, Caring for Climate, includes in its leadership 
platform the serious risks of damage from climate change and the opportunity for 
businesses of all sizes to take an active and leading role in developing and deploying 
low-carbon technologies (Fernandes & Girard, 2011). Akin to theories of ecological 
modernization, climate change is more often framed as an opportunity in recent years – 
one that also aligns with dominant norms of sustainable development. A 2008 study 
from the Carbon Trust reported that “tackling climate change could create opportunities 
for a company to increase its value up to 80% if it is well positioned and proactive” (p. 
3). Conversely, companies whose strategies remain “business-as-usual” could threaten 
up to 65 percent of their value (p. 5). The BINGOs that submitted statements to the 
UNFCCC in 2010 will be examined in Chapter 4 for similar perceptions. 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY & DATA 
International negotiations and institutions such as the UNFCCC have provided an 
arena in which countries and subpolitical organizations have “inter-subjectively come to 
some understandings about what norms concerning global warming mean” (Paterson, 
1996, p. 129). Through these processes – this creation of norms – the risks of climate 
change also have been constructed and contested, with each party bringing its own 
perspective to the proverbial table. This chapter explores research on environmental 
discourse and the analytical approaches that help examine the documents that make up 
the scope of this thesis. As such, critical environmental discourse theories and thinkers 
will be reviewed, along with recent technologies that assist in qualitative data analysis of 
this kind. 
Environmental discourse involves numerous sub-topics, such as toxic 
substances, biodiversity, air quality and climate change, and encompasses diverse 
ways of talking and thinking about the environment (Feindt & Oels, 2005). Indeed, 
Dryzek (2005) points to four dominant modern environmental discourses covering these 
issues in his seminal work, “The Politics of the Earth”: survivalism, sustainability, 
environmental problem-solving, and green radicalism. These discourses, Dryzek (2005) 
said, offer a “shared way of apprehending the world…[they] construct meanings and 
relationships, helping to define common sense and legitimate knowledge” (p. 9). More 
importantly, though, they provide the framing and articulation of a problem that shapes if 
and how it is handled (Feindt & Oels, 2005). Consequently, a discursive approach 
allows us to understand how the natural world is “produced” through environmental 
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policymaking and planning (Feindt & Oels, 2005, p. 163). Environmental discourse 
certainly has shifted over the years with the concept of risk becoming more prominent 
during the 1980s and especially after the Chernobyl and Bhopal incidents (Feindt & 
Oels, 2005). In his own environmental discourse analysis, Rothe (2011) found 
competing storylines of climate change risk while studying UNFCCC documents and 
related reports that shifted from 2007 to 2009. The concept of “climate change as war” 
was much more prominent in later years, Rothe reported, with “numerous expressions 
in the material that depict climate change as an enemy or an attack, as a criminal 
offender or as a threat” (2011, p. 337). These perspectives were then adopted by 
“discourse coalitions,” whose acceptance and propagation of such storylines further 
fueled its use. 
4.1 Discursive Approach 
While researchers have used many different notions of discourse, sometimes 
with competing definitions, this thesis defines discourse not simply as a “communicative 
exchange, but a complex entity that extends into the realms of ideology, strategy, 
language, and practice, and is shaped by the relations between power and knowledge” 
(Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p. 195). By extension, policy discourse on environmental 
issues such as climate change could be thought of as “the bundle of exchanges that 
give shape through metaphors and practices to a particular policy-making process or 
debate” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p. 195). These discourses, then, have an existence 
beyond the text and reflect the perceptions, power relations and intentions of the 
various actors. Stated broadly, discourse analysis relates texts to social practices found 
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within particular discourses, which could include institutions, norms, knowledge 
systems, social practice, and language (Livesey, 2002).  
The discursive approach applied in this thesis draws upon the discourse-
theoretical perspectives of Foucault and Hajer, whose work highlights how “language 
has the capacity to make politics, to create signs and symbols that shift power balances, 
to render events harmless or, on the contrary, to create political conflict” (Hajer & 
Versteeg, 2005, p. 179). This thesis heavily aligns its methodology and analysis with 
Foucault’s view that “different systems of meaning or discourses compete for influence 
in society and, consequently, that structural changes in society can be conceptualized 
as shifts in the relative influence of different discourses” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p. 
196). In this sense, “meaning-making is an inherently political process,” in which the first 
step is framing an issue so that it can be addressed by political policy-making (Waitt, 
Farbotko, & Criddle, 2012, p. 37). Like Foucault, Hajer assumed language was not a 
“neutral messenger of given interests and preferences,” but rather it influenced their 
formation (Feindt & Oels, 2005, p. 166). But Hajer differs from Foucault in his emphasis 
on actor coalitions. In his discursive approach, actors position themselves in the realm 
of a given discourse and try to shape it (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Akin to Hajer, Carolan 
and Bell (2003) believed that the knowledge we attach to ourselves also locates us 
discursively in a specific network or coalition. Ultimately, they argue: 
We build coalitions; we engage in collective action; we speak up, together, in a 
loud voice. And if we are loud enough and cogent enough, the result is…a 
discursive movement where the existing social relations of knowledge become 
contested, resulting in the possibility of new social relations of truth, and thus 
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new social relations of trust. How these ‘moments’ are handled and resolved can 
therefore lead to new patters of power/knowledge/identity. (Carolan & Bell, 2003, 
p. 232) 
The UNFCCC, its constituencies, and debates over climate change provide an ideal 
platform to test such theories, specifically as it relates to the construction of risk. 
4.1.1 Potential Research Bias 
Before further exploring climate change discourse and this thesis’ methodology 
and data, it is important to detail potential research bias in this work – and those efforts 
to eliminate it. Sharp and Richardson (2001) noted that the process of selecting the 
discourses that are to be the framework for any research project are subjective and 
reflect the researcher’s interests and preoccupations. Cheek (2008) also observed that 
researchers of are in a position to impose meanings on another’s text, and their 
research itself can be another product of discourse.  
In 2010, I was selected as one of about 20 delegates to attend the UNFCCC 
COP 16 negotiations in Cancún, Mexico, with the U.S.-based sustainable development 
youth NGO SustainUS. During that time, I volunteered as the NGO’s media and 
communications coordinator and worked with more than a dozen NGO communications 
colleagues in the months leading up to, during and after COP 16. In this role, I assisted 
in writing statements and press releases related to youth-issues and perspectives on 
climate change and the negotiations.  
I came into this research with respect for the critical role that discourse and 
framing can have on shaping risk perceptions of environmental issues. Working with my 
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YOUNGO and ENGO colleagues during this time, especially those who wrote opinions 
and briefs submitted to the UNFCCC prior to the COP, provided insight into the complex 
decision-making process of how to present the risks of climate change to the 
international community. To aid in eliminating potential bias, I did not include in my 
dataset any documents that I could have been involved in creating. This led me to 
select only high-level statements and opinions that were written and presented to the 
COP, as opposed to position papers and supplemental materials distributed during the 
negotiations. I did not play a role in any of the YOUNGO or Youth Climate submissions 
that are part of my data for this research. Additionally, I elected to rely solely on written 
submissions, as opposed to interviews with constituency or party leaders – several of 
whom from the YOUNGO and ENGO constituencies I have developed professional 
relationships and friendships with since COP 16.  
Just as my experiences have helped shape my personal views on international 
environmental negotiations, they also have helped to inform my academic 
understanding of the UNFCCC, its role and impact on the global stage. As someone 
who helped to shape communication about climate change for youth, I have witnessed 
first-hand how discourse is closely embedded with power and ideology and its use in 
international regimes, such as the UNFCCC. 
4.1.2 Limitations of the Study 
Like all research, this thesis has certain limitations in both its study and 
application of risk perception of climate change at international environmental 
negotiations. For one, the dataset is limited to only high-level statements and opinions 
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submitted to the UNFCCC for COP 16, as described in the following section. Indeed, 
many other texts and narratives are typically available during COPs, including but not 
limited to media coverage; position papers authored by countries’ delegations and 
NGOs or other observers; internal memorandums and newsletters produced by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat’s office; and the negotiating texts themselves. Resource and time 
constraints, coupled with the decision detailed above to not include position papers and 
verbal interviews with stakeholders, have limited my dataset in this thesis.  
Additionally, this thesis takes a discursive approach to examine documents 
affiliated with a single COP during a fixed time period. A more comprehensive study of 
risk perceptions and evolving responses to climate change would include a time-series 
study, analyzing discourse and climate change framing over a set number of years and 
relating it to negotiated outcomes of climate governance on the international stage. 
Such a study would ultimately provide us with a more complete understanding of how 
we perceive and respond to ecological risk.  
4.2 Data Selection & Analysis 
Within the above-stated framework of discourse analysis, texts were sourced 
from the UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int), which provides a database of documents 
for the Convention, all of its subsidiary bodies and ad hoc working groups. Within this 
portal is the ability to pull submissions from parties (countries) and observer 
organizations (NGOs) for each COP. All of the party and observer organization 
submissions for COP 16 were downloaded and characterized as one of the three 
constituencies for this research project – countries, ENGOs (to include YOUNGO, 
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indigenous, farmers and women’s groups) or BINGOs. To be included in the sample, 
the document had to be primarily written in English (at least 85 percent of content) – 
one of six official UN languages. About a dozen countries’ submissions were not 
included in this study because they were in Spanish; another dozen were in French; and 
another half dozen were in Arabic.  
The resulting sample of documents for this research (described in Appendix A) 
included either high-level statements – those verbally delivered to the COP plenary from 
the submitted script – or written submissions for consideration on specific UNFCCC 
negotiating issues, such as the clean development mechanism, standardized GHG 
emissions baselines, or adaptation funds. In total, this included high-level statements 
and submissions from 110 countries, 22 ENGOs and 13 BINGOs. Countries were also 
marked according to their UNFCCC party groupings, such as G-77, Annex I, OPEC, 
SIDS, and LDCs, as these groupings typically are used to present substantive interests 
of the parties in climate negotiations. Together, these documents represent a range of 
perspectives on climate change, its impacts, and necessary actions. 
4.2.1 Data Analysis & Coding 
Once the data sample was collected, I employed a computer-assisted method to 
extract the most important topics of this discourse. Rather than using a frequency and 
proximity analysis of key words and text population to explore discursive themes, I 
employed an open coding process (akin to Charmaz’s (2014) grounded theory 
approach) to identify categorizations, actions, and naming as related to climate change 
and environmental risk. This coding process allowed me to examine not only words 
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associated with constituencies’ risk perceptions of climate change but also to assess 
the language in the context of each document, providing further insight into political and 
structural forces, as well as cultural and social values. These code classifications 
(described in Appendix B) in the sample documents were marked within the MAXQDA 
software platform, which helped me quantify and analyze the codes, as discussed in the 
following chapter. While I developed the various code classifications from the reading of 
each text, they were informed and reinforced by the literature review related to climate 
change discourse. Only when the open coding process was complete, did I calculate 
word frequencies from my key discursive themes for each constituency dataset.  
Stemming from my research question of how these three UNFCCC 
constituencies perceive risk, I paid particular attention to how each actor and/or coalition 
characterized climate change. From open coding, these categorizations took on several 
sub-codes, including characterizations of climate change as a dangerous and imminent 
threat, a battle or fight and a challenge that could be “tackled” or “solved,” in addition to 
spatial imagery depicting either urgency or future concern. Rothe (2011) found similar 
themes in his analysis of documents (speeches and news articles) that discursively 
framed climate change as risk, with a focus on the future:  
Climate change in most depictions is not an actual threat but one that lies in the 
future. This is expressed by spatial and motional metaphors. The climate threat 
thus lies in front of us; we are quickly moving toward it. In this respect the Earth 
is sometimes described as a vehicle driven by humanity. Politicians in this 
narrative have the obligation to steer the vehicle safety so as to avoid the 
catastrophic threat. (p. 338) 
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The underlying assumption is that responding to climate change is a choice (and 
the “right one” can still be made), embodied by norms of responsibility and optimism 
that the climate crisis can be overcome. Closely related is imagery of climate change as 
a battle or a war that can be won through the utilization of new technologies and 
international collaboration. In his research, Rothe (2011) described this as “the 
metaphorical concept of climate change being a race or contest between the heating 
Earth and humanity or single nation states” (p. 338). Semantically, the UNFCCC seeks 
to qualify the degree of human interaction with the climate system that is dangerous, 
while these types of narratives and metaphors attach labels of risk and threat to climate 
change itself (Methmann & Rothe, 2012). Consequently, the initial human activities that 
have caused climate change are concealed through imagery and framing of climate 
change as dangerous; whereas “climate change mutates from a process rooted in 
human activity to a dangerous Other” that must be destroyed (Methmann & Rothe, 
2012, p. 328). In addition, Hulme (2008) cites similar imagery of control, mastery, or 
conquering climate change that seem almost utopian or brash in his discourse studies 
on environmental risk. 
When compared with my initial hypotheses for each constituency, the results 
were surprising. Climate change was characterized as a threat throughout the 
documents; but it was more often framed as an opportunity for either global cooperation 
or economic growth. In his opening statement to the COP 15 plenary, former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “Climate change threatens the entire human family. 
Yet it also provides an opportunity to come together and forge a collective response to a 
global problem” (cited in Methmann & Rothe, 2012, p. 329). These themes of universal 
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collaboration and partnerships among countries, industry, and community were frequent 
in my coding, as well; but so was imagery of prosperity and economic opportunity 
stemming from the climate crisis. Business interests, unlike in my hypothesis, did not 
debunk the science or risk of climate change, but rather sought greater involvement in 
the climate regime, often positioning themselves as experts and innovators for the 
future. Murphy and Murphy (2012) and Livesey (2002) cited similar themes in their own 
discourse analyses – a competition between proponents of business-as-usual versus 
actors championing a green economy. The same was true for documents in this study, 
many of which presented themes of “eco-innovation” or “sustainable economic growth” 
as pathways to future, more environmentally friendly development or technologies that 
could halt or adapt to impacts of climate change. Even ENGOs, which I predicted would 
frame climate change as a grave threat or battle for survival, also employed discourse 
of opportunity to shape a new future. 
One prediction that did align closely with my results, however, was that countries 
most at risk or those already suffering the greatest the impacts of climate change more 
often framed environmental changes as dangerous or a struggle. Another frequent 
theme and imagery in these documents and studies of related climate change discourse 
involved labeling vulnerable populations as “climate refugees” or “victims.” In their 
research of global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu, Farbotko and Lazrus (2012), 
they discovered that climate vulnerable populations, such as those on this small island 
nation, were often depicted as victims and used as evidence of the climate crisis. 
Additionally, they found that dominant global narratives, such as climate refugee 
discourse, “can entrench vulnerable communities in inequitable power relations, 
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redirecting their fate from their hands” (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 382). Cameron 
(2011) shared equal concern for supposing the fate of small island nations was doomed 
in Western environmental discourse. Following Foucault, Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) 
asserted: 
Representations of climate refugees, like any other representations, are neither 
static nor innocent. According to Foucault, they are vehicles for power, 
characterized by fluid, ongoing claims of inclusion and exclusion, dependent on 
the interests of those engaged in them. (p. 383) 
As such, particular attention is paid to climate change discourses of vulnerability and 
victimization and discussed in the next chapter, in addition to a discussion of which 
constituencies were more likely to frame climate change risk as an opportunity rather 
than a threat. 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION 
Despite rhetoric of action and urgency in the struggle with environmental climate 
change, the language of risk in the dataset is not as frequent as discourse of 
responsibility and development. Rather than apocalyptic imagery often employed to 
describe future impacts of global climate change (Methmann & Rothe, 2012), a majority 
of high-level statements and submissions by countries and NGOs, regardless of 
constituency, more often cited an opportunity to pursue sustainable growth in the face of 
a changing climate than a fight for survival. Still, those who most identified with the risks 
of climate change, either through examples of extreme weather or rising sea level, were 
leaders from countries that the UNFCCC and IPCC already characterized as the most 
vulnerable and suffering adverse impacts of climate change – the SIDS and many 
African countries.  
This chapter offers both a summative analysis to interpret latent underlying 
content meaning (Neuendorf, 2001) and a detailed discursive analysis that explores the 
most prominent framing and themes that simultaneously shape and reflect climate risk 
rationale. As stated in the previous section, I employed open coding so as to organically 
discover and identify discursive patterns in the documents, as outlined in Appendix B. 
Once my coding was complete, I calculated word frequency through MAXQDA for each 
constituency – countries, ENGOs, and BINGOs – to quantify key words identified in my 
codes (categorizations, actions, and naming related to climate change and 
environmental risk). Table 6 provides this breakdown of non-trivial word frequency for 
countries’ high-level statements, reporting usage of the words “action” or “actions” about 
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10 times greater than the word “crisis.” This finding – a call for “action” – was nearly 
universal in countries’ high-level statements. Indeed, it was almost equally matched by 
rhetoric of disapproval with past failures of the international climate regime – a theme 
that will be discussed in the following section. Consequently, a clear risk perception that 
climate change impacts must be addressed does exist; but its conflicts continue to lie in 
countries’ failure to agree on preventative measures or necessary actions (Huang, 
2009; Rothe, 2011).  
 
Table 6: Countries’ word frequency, with percentage of overall words as a 
measure of constituency dataset 
Word(s) Frequency Percentage  
Action(s) 242 0.39% 
Economic/Economies/ Economy 168 0.27% 
Impact(s) 135 0.21% 
Future 127 0.20% 
Vulnerable/Vulnerability 118 0.18% 
Responsibility/Responsible/ 
Responsibilities 
117 0.19% 
Challenge(s) 113 0.18% 
Technology 94 0.15% 
Sustainable 87 0.14% 
Political 62 0.10% 
Urgency/Urgent 56 0.09% 
Science/Scientific 49 0.08% 
Threat(s) 43 0.07% 
Risk(s) 39 0.06% 
Opportunity 37 0.06% 
Survival 25 0.04% 
Crisis 24 0.04% 
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In each of the three word frequency tables in this section, climate change was 
more often characterized as a “challenge” than a “risk,” and only among countries’ high-
level statements (the largest of the three constituencies) is the frequency of “risk” nearly 
equal to that of “opportunity.” In his research on risk communication, Hampel (2006) 
suggested risk implies a scientific and evidence-based approach and a “different 
conceptualization of the problem,” generally with an interactive element (p. 5). Of the 
countries that characterized climate change as “risk” or “crisis” (as outlined in Table 6), 
about a quarter were SIDS, while fewer than five were Annex I countries. In this 
discourse arena, Micronesia made its intentions clear:  
 
…if we in governments continue to deal with climate change merely as a 
challenge instead of a crisis we are certain to dance around this crisis until it is 
too late to overcome it.  
 
Micronesia’s statement aligns with the work of Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006), 
whose climate change perception research found that individuals related to climate 
change through personal experiences and knowledge, and the most salient discourses 
about climate change were connected with peoples’ locality.  
A major focus for NGO submissions and statements is the inclusion of new 
voices into the climate change regime, akin to Beck’s emergence of subpolitics and 
counter-conducts (Pieck, 2013) that develop from risk society. Table 7 reports the high 
frequency of calls for “participation” of civil society in ENGOs’ submissions to the 
UNFCCC. Often these references were linked to the need for shared knowledge 
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resources of climate change among the world’s population and a “right” to join in 
international climate change discourse and action. The statement from the International 
Federation of Medical Students’ Association to the UNFCCC illustrates this discourse: 
 
Climate Change is widely recognized as the biggest global health threat of the 
21st century, and the world in which today’s children are growing up in is 
changing. It is only fair that children and young people, who hold the biggest 
stake in our shared future, are empowered to take positive action…Youth 
empowerment and education is a key part of the fight against climate change. 
 
Table 7: ENGOs’ word frequencies, with percentage of overall words as a 
measure of constituency dataset 
              Word(s) Frequency Percentage 
Participation 263 0.95% 
Information/Knowledge/ 
Awareness/Education 
198 0.72% 
Development/Developing/ 
Developed 
144 0.53% 
Public 140 0.51% 
Action(s) 100 0.36% 
Right(s) 79 0.29% 
Youth 48 0.17% 
Opportunity/Opportunities 30 0.11% 
Challenge(s) 24 0.09% 
Risk(s) 19 0.07% 
Threat(s)/Threaten 16 0.06% 
 
Table 8 reports BINGOs’ frequent concerns with countries’ development paths – 
another theme that will be addressed in the following section – and abundant 
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technology as discourse, consistent with Dryzek’s environmental problem-solving 
taxonomy. Nippon Keidanren, or the Japan Business Federation, cites corporations’ 
critical role in “green” development and technology as the solution to climate change in 
its submission to the UNFCCC: 
 
Industries play key roles to realize global low-carbon society as the source of 
technology and innovation. To tackle climate change, especially in the long run, it 
is imperative that they disseminate and make maximum use of existing 
technologies and develop innovative technologies.  
 
This discourse is both prosaic and reformist – assuming a status quo of 
economic growth and industrialization, but one that Tuler (1998) said is undergoing 
“some pragmatic adjustment” (p. 66). These findings are consistent with Schlichting’s 
application of framing theory to industries’ climate change communication strategies 
from 1990 to 2010 – from scientific uncertainty and negative socioeconomic 
consequences to industrial leadership and technological salvation. Indeed, Lund (2012) 
identified industries’ growing utilization of technological innovation and expertise in 
climate change discourse. Table 8 below illustrates BINGOs’ use of “expertise” more 
frequently than “opportunity.” Also of note, are BINGOs’ desire to take an even greater 
role in “international cooperation on climate change,” as this constituency’s high-level 
statement indicates, along with assertions of a “critical [need] to develop enhanced 
channels [in the UNFCCC regime] to benefit from the expertise and know-how of 
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business.” Risk and threat framing are only used to assert BINGOs’ necessary 
involvement in the negotiations. 
 
Table 8: BINGOs’ word frequencies, with percentage of overall words as a 
measure of constituency dataset 
Word(s) Frequency Percentage 
Development/Developing/ 
Developed 
168 0.98% 
Technology 114 0.67% 
Business(es) 108 0.63% 
Private 92 0.48% 
Environmental/Environment 37 0.21% 
Expertise 28 0.16% 
Opportunity/Opportunities 20 0.12% 
Economic/Economies 18 0.11% 
Challenge(s) 17 0.09% 
Risk(s) 8 0.05% 
Threat 1 0.01% 
 
This last table, Table 9, shows a comparison of the three UNFCCC 
constituencies’ top five non-trivial word frequencies, of which the words “risk,” 
“challenge,” and “danger” are not included. 
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Table 9: Comparison of constituencies’ top five non-trivial word frequencies, in 
order of frequency 
Countries ENGOs BINGOs 
Action(s) Participation 
Development/ 
Developing/ 
Developed 
Economic/Economies/
Economy 
Information/Knowledge/ 
Awareness/Education 
Technology 
Impact(s) 
Development/Developing/ 
Developed 
Business(es) 
Future Public Private 
Vulnerable/ 
Vulnerability 
Action(s) 
Environmental/ 
Environment 
 
5.1 Discursive Themes 
Three discursive themes emerge from the discourse identified in the documents: 
an opportunity to shape the future; a continuation of the battle between North and 
South; and dissatisfaction with the current climate change regime. Consistent with the 
theories of Foucault and Hajer, these discourses give meaning to social and physical 
phenomena (Feindt & Oels, 2005), while reflecting each actor or actor coalitions’ power 
relations and cultural values. Within these discursive themes lie struggles of 
development, human rights, morality, and accountability, all of which are discussed 
below: 
5.1.1 Climate Change Opportunities 
In 2014, Canadian activist and critic of globalization Naomi Klein told The Atlantic 
that climate change should be perceived as an opportunity to dramatically reinvent our 
economic and social structures to tackle deeper issues of global sustainability, inequity 
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and political fairness5.  In other words, the climate crisis presents a chance for the world 
collectively to question how it grows, how it distributes goods, and how we can work 
together to shape our future. This reformist stance is certainly consistent with Beck’s 
theorizing of reflexive modernity, and it is apparent in many of the UNFCCC statements, 
particularly from ENGOs and non-Annex I countries. Several examples of this discourse 
are below: 
 
We now have the opportunity to transform current paradigms, [and prevent 
further damage] by reducing inequalities, enhancing human rights and agreeing 
collectively on a comprehensive approach to combat climate change and save 
ecosystem integrity and humanity’s future. (Women and Gender Constituency, 
2010) 
 
Today the whole world community is striving for green growth, the countries are 
discussing opportunities of the economic development by avoiding damage to 
environment…to a new paradigm of development. (Kazakhstan, 2010) 
 
We must now inject a new economic logic where it is more beneficial for nations 
and communities to keep the trees up, than to chop them down. (Indonesia, 
2010) 
 
                                            
5
 See Shaban (2014) for full interview. 
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It is high time for mankind to adopt new models of development and divorce from 
business as usual in order to protect life on Earth…however this may be taxing 
and difficult now, we strongly believe that it is worth the sacrifices and it is 
surmountable by applying the finest technologies the best innovative brains have 
already produced. (Eritrea, 2010) 
 
While Eritrea, an LDC member, offered the only mention in the dataset of 
sacrificing status quo or dominant paradigms for a new model of development, each of 
the examples above utilizes climate change impacts or future risks as a catalyst to 
explore how we can respond differently to address international economic and social 
issues. These statements also are similar in their dependence on technology or 
innovation as a means to deliver such changes, typical of ecological modernization 
discourse (Huber, 2004). Yet the above examples differ greatly from ecological 
modernization theories favoring market-driven approaches toward “green” growth – best 
represented by statements from Annex I parties and nations with emerging economies: 
 
… in industry, politics and society, we now see climate policy as an opportunity 
and a challenge, not as a threat…Because when we talk about fighting climate 
change, we are always also talking about economic growth and development. So 
the transformation is actually a growth strategy. (Germany, 2010) 
 
Ecology and economies are not a contradiction in terms…The economy, 
primarily the private sector, has an interest in investing, if we create the 
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necessary incentives, ensure technology transfers and if new, environmentally-
friendly goods are affordable for consumers. (Switzerland, 2010) 
 
India will not only be amongst the fastest growing economies in the world as 
measured by GDP – Gross Domestic Product – but will also be amongst the 
most responsible in ensuring a high rate of growth of the real GDP – Green 
Domestic Product. (India, 2010) 
 
Brazil has shown that economic growth, social justice and environmental 
protection is not just compatible but represent a development strategy. (Brazil, 
2010) 
 
Consistent with Huber’s ecological modernization theory, these nations reject the idea 
that development would degrade environmental conditions. Instead, climate change 
forces us to “work together to turn this challenge into opportunities for economic growth 
through the advancement of green technologies and energy solutions,” as Annex I 
nation-state Malta suggested in its statement. Acquiring and applying these new 
solutions also implies that countries could leapfrog technologically and institutionally, as 
inferred in the statements from those with rapidly emerging economies. Climate change 
for these countries presents an opportunity for economic growth, which in this discourse 
outweighs risk. 
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5.1.2 The Battle Between North and South 
Another closely linked development discourse prominent in these documents 
was clear conflict between the roles and responsibilities of developed versus developing 
countries, or North versus South in addressing the risks of climate change. In the 
examples below from global South countries and an ENGO, developed countries are 
perceived at fault for blocking solutions to current and future climate change impacts for 
which they bear responsibility: 
 
The developed countries have before them once more the opportunity to make a 
choice in favor of making commitments that entail true meaning instead of 
continuing to cling to the selfish practices that have led the world into this 
dangerous situation. (Cuba, 2010) 
 
We do not have any more time for lengthy delaying tactics; annex 1 countries 
need to demonstrate real leadership in this important area now! (Zambia, 2010) 
 
Barbados continues to believe that narrow self interests will eventually give way 
to our collective sense of humanity and fairness, to ensure a sustainable path for 
current and future generations. (Barbados, 2010) 
 
The continued over-occupation by the rich of the remaining atmospheric space 
and the failure to accept responsibility for deep emission reductions consistence 
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with science and equity is indeed a travesty of justice. (Friends of the Earth, 
2010) 
 
These examples evoke notions of fairness and justice, which frequently arose in 
the dataset when addressing the Southern countries’ rights – whether it is a right to 
develop (as evidence in Trinidad and Tobago’s statement below) or a right to survive 
(as in the Philippines and Botswana’s statements below). Rather than evoking rights 
discourse, the global North was more apt to call for a tempered solution that sought 
compromise among all parties (as in the statements from the United Kingdom and Italy 
below):  
 
We believe that equity issues need to be defined…on the rights of all countries to 
develop sustainably and not at the expense of others. (Trinidad and Tobago, 
2010) 
 
Vulnerable countries such as the Philippines should not be made to feel like we 
are the defendants in this TRIAL FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL. (Philippines, 2010) 
 
We live with compromises but bearing in mind that you are asking us to 
compromise our existence for the sake of our shared common space to which we 
bear no responsibility to the carbon dioxide emissions that threaten the rich and 
poor. (Botswana, 2010) 
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The answer has to be a compromise. We cannot do everything here. But we can 
make progress on mitigation, deforestation, adaptation, finance, reporting and 
more. And restore momentum to the global process. Concrete steps to the treaty 
we want. (United Kingdom, 2010) 
 
In this negotiation, we know that pitching our ambitions too high and too soon 
could backfire, and prevent us from reaching the crucial, yet attainable results we 
need. (Italy, 2010) 
 
The statements from Trinidad and Tobago, the Philippines, and Botswana recognize the 
agency of vulnerable populations, and their demands for the global North to assume 
responsibility for addressing climate change impacts. While the global North was more 
apt to characterize the negotiations as a long-term compromise (“The new climate deal 
may not satisfy all,” the Czech Republic said in its high-level statement), strong 
discourse of responsibility was still prominent among these nations: 
 
We owe it to them – and to all other citizens of this world to whom climate 
change is already now a fact of life – to end this week with a set of decisions. 
(European Union, 2010) 
 
As a developed nation New Zealand has a responsibility to assist our Pacific 
Island neighbours who are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. (New 
Zealand, 2010) 
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This framing of self-responsibility, though, was not unique to global North countries. 
Indeed, the global South invoked rights discourse and morality to address 
environmental risks – and in at least one instance debunked the role of victim (akin to 
the findings of Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012) to take action against climate change: 
 
The most vulnerable countries must own up the fact that crying a victim will not 
stop their farm land from drying or the sea level from rising. We too have a role 
for the damages to our Climate, through destruction of our forests. And the world 
is demanding the spirit of self-help. (Kenya, 2010) 
 
We, therefore, have a moral obligation to save humanity from doom. (Solomon 
Islands, 2010) 
 
These discourses of obligation illustrate the collective responsibility shared by countries 
to tackle the climate crisis, which many countries cited in their UNFCCC statements. 
5.1.3 Criticism of Climate Regime 
Iterations of morality and responsibility were not only apparent in the context of 
development and collaboration in addressing climate change risks, but also in 
frustrations with UNFCCC governance (also in Huang, 2009; Webb, 2007; Bulkeley, 
2001). Prevalent in this discursive theme are calls for action – the more frequently cited 
words in countries’ high-level statements. In the statements below, the risks of climate 
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change are pitted against international governance, structural policymaking, and 
proceedings: 
 
…we don’t have the privilege to be unnecessarily bogged down on phrases and 
words to be inserted or deleted in the negotiated text. We must act with utmost 
urgency and due diligence to save lives of millions and their precious 
civilizations. (Nepal, 2010) 
  
We were extremely disappointed with the outcome of Copenhagen. It is a 
tragedy to think that over a 110 heads of state could not unite to tackle climate 
change in a meaningful way. (Tuvalu, 2010) 
 
All eyes are upon us…The time for action is now. Let us ‘stop the talk and walk 
the walk.’ We must get the job done for our planet; we must get the job done [for] 
our children. (Belize, 2010) 
 
The gravity of the crisis has escaped us. It has become lost in a fog of scientific, 
economic, and technical jargon. Without bold action, it will be left to our children 
to come up with the words to convey the tragedy of losing our homelands when it 
did not have to be this way. (SIDS, 2010) 
 
These statements reflect the risk of inaction in the fight against climate change, 
while criticizing the structural forces enacted to address these ills. Huang (2009), 
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McNamara and Gibson (2009), and Paavola and Adger (2006) reported consistent 
growing frustrations from the most vulnerable nations – SIDS and many in the global 
South – which are forced to simultaneously battle climate change risks on the ground 
while making little headway toward solutions on the international stage. These 
statements also are reflective of the hegemony of climate negotiations, and bias toward 
the global capitalist system.6 Pidgeon and Butler (2009) found that contemporary risk 
approaches aligned with dominant political rationalities in Western nations, but had 
limited effectiveness in delivering aggressive climate policy aims for the international 
community. In many ways, these risks of stalled action or preferential treatment toward 
Annex I nations are as perceivably damaging as the risks of the future climate change 
impacts. Interestingly, the United States does not mention the risks of climate change in 
its high-level statement; instead focusing on the actions it has taken since Copenhagen 
to operationalize what “our leaders agreed last year.” Global economic leader China, on 
the other hand, declared itself a “victim to global climate change” and stated “the 
international community must enhance cooperation to tackle it.”  
This discursive theme of criticizing the UNFCC also represents a population of 
environmental activists and supporters who have lost faith in the multilateral 
negotiations. Bump (2012), who called the annual climate change conferences 
“pointless,” also described them this way: 
They are good for providing an excuse for the well-heeled to tour the world every 
winter, but they are fruitless in terms of adopting remedies for global warming 
and obviously ineffective in curtailing greenhouse gas pollution.  
                                            
6
 For an analysis of Western bias in international theory, see Young (2014). 
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Indeed, this discursive theme was most prevalent among ENGOs, as illustrated in these 
examples: 
 
The world has not forgotten that for two decades we have failed to reach an 
agreement that would accelerate firm actions to address and combat climate 
change…The world is watching and you must not forget that you have the 
privilege of representing us. You have been sent to listen and act to do the right 
thing for the planet and its future. (Climate Action Network, 2010) 
 
Representatives of Indigenous Peoples from all over the world attending this 
climate conference collectively express our dismay and severe disappointment 
over the lack of political will and good faith negotiations to truly and effectively 
combat climate change. (IPO, 2010) 
 
To be young and aware today is to see your elders – from doctors and scientists 
to lawyers and bankers – telling us that we’re in the final countdown, with the risk 
or runaway climate change mounting with everyday we run business as usual… 
to be young and aware today is to be confused. To wonder why you can stand in 
front of us and both call for change, and refuse to change. (YOUNGO, 2010) 
 
It is not surprising that ENGOs, SIDS, and developing nations were the most vocal in 
the urgency of addressing climate change and most critical of these efforts to date. 
Paavola and Adger (2006) found that the most vulnerable typically had the least voice in 
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the international climate regime, while also suffering (or are projected to suffer, in the 
case of future generations) the most from these environmental risks; so these 
constituencies’ cries for participation, for future generations, and for action resounded in 
each of their high-level statements and submissions. In this set of documents, then, it is 
not the risk of climate change and its damaging impacts that these nations and groups 
fear most, but rather the risk of nations and world leaders not taking action to mitigate or 
adapt to them. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has sought a better understanding of risk perceptions of climate 
change in international negotiations. Drawing upon theorizing of risk society from Beck 
and others, this thesis began with an examination of how risk is constructed and asked 
whether explanations for such divergent responses to climate change could lie in 
analyzing risk perceptions, because these perceptions influence our orientation and 
actions toward environmental hazards. Like Beck, this thesis asserted that risk does not 
standalone; it is socially constructed and evolves over time. Consistent with Beck 
(2010a), Rothe (2011), and Thompson and Rayner (2000), this thesis argued that risk is 
different from hazard, and from uncertainty; it is derived from perceptions embedded 
within broader political discourses. As such, perceptions of ecological risk vary from 
country and constituency without singular or universal definitions of “dangerous climate 
change.” Of course, many countries and civil society groups claim in varying degrees to 
already be impacted by climate change, through extreme weather events, changing 
agricultural practices, or other adaptation methods and technologies. Indeed, this thesis 
found that nearly every actor (at every level) admitted to facing environmental changes 
to some extent; where they differed was in their framing of climate change as a crisis or 
opportunity, as best fit their dominant political and social discourse.  
6.1 Risk on an International Stage 
With its submissions from countries and civil society constituencies, the 
UNFCCC provides a comprehensive arena in which to study climate change risk 
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perceptions. That is because the UNFCCC in many ways already embodies what Beck 
and others consider a product of risk society, in which a transnational body of actors – 
along with subpolitical actors outside the state – have come together to collectively 
address a global risk that they cannot individually confront. Climate change has 
exceeded the limits of national risk-management institutions, prompting a new risk 
society that must “transcend the boundaries of national states and thus open up a 
window of opportunity for a more cooperative international order to evolve” (Rothe, 
2011, p. 332). 
The documents analyzed in this thesis, however, do not universally offer evidence 
of more cooperative international order. In fact, they often show countries’ and non-state 
constituencies’ divergent reactions and responses to the problem. Reflecting the 
cultural, political, economic, and social values from constituencies across the 
international community, these statements also offer much more than risk perceptions 
of climate change. They provide substantial evidence that climate change is not simply 
an environmental question, but rather one of economic, political, and social norms. 
Perceptions and responses to climate change are embedded within countries’ or actor 
coalitions’ discourses of governance, modernization, environmentalism, and rights or 
responsibilities. While nations and civil society appear united in the belief that climate 
change implies at least some threat to existing ways of life, these constituencies differ in 
their responses to such environmental risk. Ultimately, this thesis found evidence for 
Hilde’s (2012) claim that the UNFCCC is a forum with “two-level norms”: despite some 
“basic norms regarding climate change,” countries still revert to national self-interest at 
the negotiating table (p.894). 
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Using discourse analysis of high-level statements and submissions from 110 
countries and 35 NGOs (environmental- and industry-focused), this thesis found that 
nations and civil society perceived the risks of climate change in larger contexts of their 
own development, economic growth, and social equity. Non-trivial words such as 
“action,” “opportunity,” “rights,” and “future” were more frequently cited than “threat,” 
“risk,” or “survival.”  For some, the risks of climate change presented an opportunity; for 
others, an illustration of the continued dominance of the global North; and for even 
others, a reason to act locally for the sake of future generations rather than wait for 
international cooperation. How each constituency perceived climate change was also a 
reflection of how they perceived themselves – a victim, an expert, a leader, or a 
protector.  
 In analyzing risk perceptions of climate change, this thesis sought to provide 
some understanding for the different actions and responses of varying countries and 
key non-state constituencies to our changing environment. While this study of risk 
perceptions did not offer a comprehensive critique of the legitimacy of international 
climate governance, several of its findings hint at the limitations of the current regime in 
responding to global environmental crises. Like risk, the emergence of the world’s 
environmental regime is socially derived. Lipschutz (1996) called international climate 
governance “a reaction to certain processes of social transformation at work upon 
human civilization and its constituent societies” (p. 1). Changing our response to the 
climate crisis also would entail changing our perceptions. Or, as Lipschutz (1996) 
described, changing “how we conceptualized global environmental change”: 
74 
 
As often as not, damage to the environment is described in terms of its physical 
characteristics – the declining numbers of a particular species, the loss of so many 
inches of soil, the presence of so much pollution in air or water, the increase in 
average global temperature or the decrease in stratospheric ozone concentrations – 
with the implication that policy should focus on the things that can be counted 
instead of the things that count. (p. 4) 
Several LDCs and SIDS echoed this sentiment in their high-level statements to the COP 
16, citing environmental damages in terms of inequitable and unsustainable 
development, a loss of culture or way of life, and even damage to a sentient “Nature” or 
“Mother Earth” from climate change. Others, such as Samoa, feared the impact of 
inaction on future generations: “Individually and jointly we must make tough and bold 
decisions to ensure that we cannot continue to develop in a manner that transfers to 
future generations a debt they cannot pay and did not ask to inherit.”  
Yet, for most countries – the primary actors in the climate regime – such solutions 
continue to be difficult to accomplish. That is because states remain highly resistant to 
imposing on themselves any “enforceable obligation” that would alter their social or 
economic norms or institutions “in a serious way” (Lipschutz, 1996, p. 39). Achieving 
such a shift would mean that governments must embrace a new “political will” that 
“requires a convergence of interests among contesting groups and elites” (Lipschutz, 
1996, 29).  
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6.2 Change Beyond the State 
The UNFCCC certainly has provided a first step toward addressing the global 
problems of climate change by bringing parties together to collectively work on 
environmental issues. But its current approach to climate change has diverged from its 
original objective and principles – primarily to achieve stable atmospheric GHG 
concentrations based on precaution and equity (Sagara, 2009). Indeed, Audrey Meyer, 
director of the Global Commons Institute, a London-based think tank for global climate 
solutions, described the limitations of the UNFCCC’s current negotiations:  
The main problem of the present approach is that parties [countries] are still 
negotiating what they perceive as their own interests or their own group interests. 
We all know that we must come together into a unified reckoning, but there seems 
to be an inability to come to order within the limits that now constrain us all. 
(Sagara, 2009).  
Consequently, the impetus and answer to achieve environmental accord may lie 
beyond the state system. The rise of subpolitical groups is critical to Beck’s theorizing of 
reflexive modernity, in which non-state actors begin to operate outside of, or beyond, 
state lines to address issues of global risk. This thesis provided evidence that this 
process is underway, yet far from achieving what Beck had envisioned. Today’s 
UNFCCC regime offers examples of subpolitical activity with the increasing number of 
NGOs participating in the negotiations. Indeed, such groups were critical in formulating 
language for the first environmental agreements and alliances for presentation at the 
1992 Earth Summit (Lipschutz, 1996). Yet Lipschutz (1996) has simultaneously cited 
growing evidence for a “revolving door” among government, industry, and NGOs without 
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a clear separating of funding sources or agendas (p. 51). Earlier in this thesis, I cited 
Schroeder and Lovell’s (2012) finding that many national delegations also admit NGO, 
municipal, or business representatives into their delegations, further blurring barriers 
between state and non-state interests. Such collaboration between state and non-state 
actors is necessary to reach certain aims within existing structures. The question is 
whether these groups collectively can effect legitimate institutional change and a shifting 
of norms to achieve a comprehensive binding solution to the climate crisis.  
Throughout much of the world, Wapner (1996) said NGOs and community-based 
organizations “have traditionally served as conduits for government policy” and “have 
been unofficial arms of the government” (p. 106). But for those groups that do not, the 
effects have been transformative: 
They can take control of their own lives and environments and no longer fall easy 
prey to national or international pressures. Furthermore, the effects of their efforts 
can fan out to the larger dynamics of international politics. (p. 106) 
As such, Wapner (1996) cited groups as diverse as Indian activists resisting dam 
development to Greenpeace’s non-violent actions “bearing witness” to harp seal killings 
and nuclear testing off the coast of Canada and the U.S. Pacific Northwest as impacting 
national and international policies because of their actions (p. 50). Several of the 
ENGOs analyzed in this paper, particularly the youth-focused movements, have 
achieved similar results, including Project Survival, an international youth journalism 
network producing video and photo documentaries on survival and ingenuity in the face 
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of climate change.7 Like its environmental NGO counterparts, Project Survival seeks to 
garner greater awareness of the climate crisis through a growing network of global 
media that ultimately will help to educate and influence new perceptions of the risks of 
climate change to sway national and international opinion and action. Such examples 
reflect Wapner’s (1996) idea that “states do not hold monopolies over the instruments 
that govern human affairs but rather that nonstate forms of governance exist and can be 
used to effect widespread change” (p. 7). Such civic activism is a form of governance, 
Wapner (1996) argued, because it provides a way to create conditions to direct and 
order others’ activities.  
 Ultimately, today’s climate governance might best align with Ken Booth’s 
metaphor for the changing nature of global politics – the “international system which is 
now developing…is of an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it 
a global community omelette is cooking” (as cited in Lipschutz, 1996, p. 52).  
Invigorating the climate change debate and influencing perceptions is not a top-down 
approach. Indeed, answering the question of who rules climate change governance is a 
multi-faceted one. Much of the regime’s implementation will take place at the regional 
and local levels, “in the places where people live, not where their laws are made” 
(Lipschutz, 1996, p. 250). For a climate regime to be successful, it must function as a 
global institution with governance at the local, regional, national, and international 
stages, changing perception at every level.
                                            
7
 This group, whose work is available at http://projectsurvivalmedia.org, uses visual media of climate 
change to encourage action and change perceptions about climate change, akin to Greenpeace’s 
practice of “bearing witness” to link moral sensitivities with political responsibility (Wapner, 1996, p. 50).  
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APPENDIX A: LISTING OF SAMPLE DOCUMENTS 
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Countries High-Level Statements to COP 16 
Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
Afghanistan EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Albania EN     Y   
Eastern 
European 
      
Algeria EN     Y   OPEC G-77     
Alliance of Small 
Island States 
(AOSIS) 
EN                 
Argentina SP     Y   GRULAC G-77     
Australia EN Y Y     Umbrella WEOG     
Austria EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Bangladesh EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
  G-77   
Barbados EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Belize EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Bhutan EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
EN     Y   
Eastern 
European 
G-77     
Botswana EN     Y   African Group G-77     
Brazil EN     Y   GRULAC G-77     
Brunei 
Darussalam 
EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Canada EN Y Y     Umbrella WEOG     
China EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
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Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
Croatia EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
      
Cuba EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Cyprus EN Y       
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
European 
Union 
    
Czech Republic EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
European 
Union 
    
Denmark EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Dominica EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Eritrea EN     Y Y African Group       
Estonia EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
European 
Union 
    
European Union EN Y Y             
Fiji EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77 SIDS 
Finland EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Gambia EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Georgia EN/SP     Y   
Eastern 
European 
      
Germany EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Ghana EN     Y   African Group G-77     
Greece EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Group of 77 and 
China 
EN                 
Guyana EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Iceland EN Y Y     WEOG       
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Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
India EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Indonesia EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Iran EN     Y   OPEC 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77   
Ireland EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Israel EN     Y   WEOG       
Italy EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
      
Jamaica EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Japan EN Y Y     Umbrella 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
    
Kazakhstan EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
      
Kenya EN     Y   African Group G-77     
Lao EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
      
Latin American 
and Caribbean 
Group (GRULAC) 
EN                 
Least Developed 
Countries Group 
EN                 
Lebannon EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Lesotho EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Liberia EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Liechtenstein EN Y       
Environmental 
Integrity 
Group 
WEOG     
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Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
Macedonia EN         
Eastern 
European 
      
Malawi EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Malaysia EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Maldives EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77   
Malta EN Y       
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Marshall Islands EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77 SIDS 
Mauritius EN     Y   African Group AOSIS G-77   
Micronesia EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77 SIDS 
Mongolia EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Montenegro EN     Y   
Eastern 
European 
      
Mozambique EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Namibia EN     Y   African Group G-77     
Nepal EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Netherlands EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
New Zealand EN Y Y     Umbrella WEOG     
Nigeria EN     Y   African Group OPEC G-77   
Norway EN Y Y     Umbrella WEOG     
Pacific Small 
Island Developing 
States 
EN                 
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Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
Pakistan EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Palestine EN     Y   G-77       
Philippines EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Poland EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
European 
Union 
    
Portugal EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Republic of Palau EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS SIDS   
Republic of 
Suriname 
EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Romania EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
European 
Union 
    
Russia EN Y       Umbrella 
Eastern 
European 
    
Rwanda EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Samoa EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77 SIDS 
Saudi Arabia EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
OPEC     
Seychelles EN     Y   African Group AOSIS G-77   
Sierra Leone EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Singapore EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77   
Slovakia EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
European 
Union 
    
Slovenia EN Y       
Eastern 
European 
European 
Union 
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Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
Solomon Islands EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77 SIDS 
Somalia EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
South Africa EN     Y   African Group G-77     
South Korea EN     Y   
Environmental 
Integrity 
Group 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
    
Sri Lanka EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Sweden EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
Switzerland EN Y Y     
Environmental 
Integrity 
Group 
WEOG     
Tajikistan EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Tanzania EN       Y African Group G-77     
Thailand EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Timor Leste EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77   
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
EN     Y   GRULAC AOSIS G-77   
Turkey EN Y Y     
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
WEOG     
Tuvalu EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS SIDS   
Uganda EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Ukraine EN Y       Umbrella 
Eastern 
European 
    
United Arab 
Emirates 
EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
OPEC G-77   
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Nation/Regional 
Groups 
Language Annex I  Annex II 
Non 
Annex I 
LCD 
Party 
Groupings 1 
Party 
Groupings 2 
Party 
Groupings 3 
Party 
Groupings 4 
United Kingdom 
and Northern 
Ireland 
EN Y Y     
European 
Union 
WEOG     
United States EN Y Y     Umbrella WEOG     
Vanuatu EN     Y Y 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
AOSIS G-77 SIDS 
Vietnam EN     Y   
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
G-77     
Zambia EN     Y Y African Group G-77     
Zimbabwe EN     Y   African Group G-77     
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NGO Submissions to COP 16 
Date Organization(s) Topic ENGO/BINGO 
August 20 2010 
Clean Energy Nepal (CEN); Energy Crossroads (EC); European 
Youth Forum (YFJ); Federation of Young European Greens 
(FYEG); International Federation of Liberal Youth (IFLRY); 
International Federation of Medical Students Association 
(IFMSA); International Forestry Student Association (IFSA); 
Jeunes Volontaires pour l'Environnement (JVE); Service Civil 
International (SCI); SustainUS; UK Youth Climate Coalition 
(UKYCC); World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts 
(WAGGGS) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO (youth) 
August 16 2010 Corporación Grupo Tayrona 
New Delhi Work 
Programme; Article 6 
ENGO (youth) 
August 16 2010 
European Youth Forum (YFJ) and World Association of Girl 
Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS) 
New Delhi Work 
Programme; Article 6 
ENGO (youth) 
August 27 2010 International Federation of Medical Students' Associations 
New Delhi Work 
Programme; Article 6 
ENGO (youth) 
August 20 2010 
United Kingdom Youth Climate Coalition (UKYCCC) on behalf 
of YOUNGO 
New Delhi Work 
Programme; Article 6 
ENGO (youth) 
August 2010 YOUNGO 
New Delhi Work 
Programme; Article 6 
ENGO (youth) 
August 15 2010 Climate Action Network International (CAN) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO 
August 16 2010 Climate Action Network International (CAN) 
Clean development 
mechanism 
ENGO 
August 16 2010 Climate Action Network International (CAN) Nairobi Work Programme ENGO 
March 22 2010 Climate Action Network International (CAN) Standardized baselines ENGO 
March 22 2010 Climate Action Network International (CAN) 
Adaptation Fund under 
Kyoto 
ENGO 
August 18 2010 Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO 
August 16 2010 GenderCC - Women for Climate Justice Nairobi Work Programme ENGO 
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Date Organization(s) Topic ENGO/BINGO 
September 9 
2010 
GenderCC-Women for Climate Justice (GenderCC) on behalf of 
Life e.V.; Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF); 
Women's Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO 
August 16 2010 Global Witness on behalf of the Ecosystems Climate Alliance 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO 
August 31 2010 
Joint submission by Climate Action Network-International 
Secretariat (ENGO Focal Point); International Federation of 
Agricultural Producers (Farmers Focal Point); ICLEI-Local 
Governments for Sustainability (LGMA Focal point); GenderCC 
(Women and Gender Focal Point); Service Civil International 
(YOUNGO Focal Point) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO 
August 16 2010 Life e.V. and GenderCC-Women for Climate Justice 
New Delhi Work 
Programme; Article 6 
ENGO 
August 16 2010 WWF International 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
ENGO 
September 1 
2010 
Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE); Carbon 
Markets & Investors Association (CMIA); Global Wind Energy 
Council (GWEC); International Council for Sustainable Energy 
(ICSE); International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
BINGO 
August 16 2010 Carbon Markets and Investors Association 
Clean development 
mechanism 
BINGO 
March 23 2010 Climate Action Reserve Standardized baselines BINGO 
March 22 2010 EURELECTRIC Standardized baselines BINGO 
August 12 2010 Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
BINGO 
March 22 2010 Global Wind Energy Council Standardized baselines BINGO 
August 16 2010 International Chamber of Commercie (ICC) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
BINGO 
March 23 2010 International Emissions Trading Association Standardized baselines BINGO 
August 16 2010 Keidanren 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
BINGO 
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Date Organization(s) Topic ENGO/BINGO 
March 22 2010 Transport Research Foundation Standardized baselines BINGO 
August 16 2010 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
Enhance engagement of 
observer organizations 
BINGO 
 
 
NGO High-Level Statements to COP 16 
Organization(s) ENGO/BINGO 
BINGO (on behalf of constituency) BINGO 
International Trade Union Confederation BINGO 
YOUNGO (on behalf of constituency) ENGO 
International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on 
Climate Change ENGO 
Farmers (on behalf of constituency) ENGO 
ICAE (on behalf of Women and Gender) ENGO 
Friends of the Earth ENGO 
Climate Action Network International  ENGO 
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MAXQDA CODE CLASSIFICATIONS & DEFINITIONS 
 
Climate Change Characterizations – This code includes any characterizations of 
climate change in the selected documents. Specific sub-codes cover climate change 
characterizations as (a) a crisis; (b) dangerous and/or destructive; (c) adverse impacts 
and/or effects; (d) catastrophic; (e) a battle or fight; (f) a challenge; (g) a risk; (h) a 
“tipping point;” (i) a threat; and (j) irreversible or unavoidable. 
Damage from Climate Change – Examples include descriptions of physical damage 
associated with climate change, to include flooding, human death, sea level rise and 
other destructive outcomes associated with increased weather activity.  
Controlling Climate Change – Examples include “tackling” or “solving” climate change. 
Sub-codes involve language of (a) avoiding climate change; (b) reversing the impacts of 
climate change; and (c) utilizing technology as a tool against climate change impacts. 
Time – Coded examples involve language that refers to a time element related to 
climate change, particularly a sense of urgency to address climate change impacts. 
Additional references include a countdown to act. 
Call for Action – Often closely related to the “Time” code, this code involves language 
depicting a need to act or for action from the parties of the UNFCCC process or as a 
reaction to climate change impacts. 
Collaboration – Examples include language of collaboration or working together to 
address the impacts of climate change, whether as part of the UNFCCC process or 
beyond.  
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Responsibility and/or Accountability – This code marks language associated with 
those having a responsibility to respond to climate change impacts. This code was often 
found in the context of developed versus developing countries and those who had the 
least impact on the climate suffering the worst impacts. Sub-codes include references to 
(a) human-made or anthropogenic and (b) morality, as a moral obligation to respond to 
climate change.  
Risk Management and/or Prevention – Examples involve language of resilience and 
adaptation to the risks associated with climate change. This code is separate from other 
descriptions of climate change throughout the documents, as specific adaptive action or 
measures toward resilience must be included in this classification.  
Failure at UNFCCC – This code includes references in the documents to perceived 
shortcomings of the UNFCCC process and a failure of the parties to act.  
Victimization – Examples include using the word “victims” to describe anyone who 
suffers due to climate change impacts. 
Opportunity – This code captures the language of opportunity, future or optimism in the 
selected documents. It often is in reference to action at the UNFCCC but also revolves 
on language associate with growth. As such, a sub-code involves economic growth.  
Mother Earth or Nature – This code includes references to “Mother Earth” or nature as 
sentient.  
Science – This code involves references to the science of climate change and scientific 
findings or predictions. A sub-code captures language of skepticism toward science.  
Choices and Decisions – This code is closely tied to “Call for Action” and involves 
references to choices or decisions as actions that one can take against climate change. 
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It implies that climate change and its affects are not foregone conclusions, and that 
parties have the ability to take action, but it must be through choice and active decision-
making.  
Future Generations – This code marks any mention of future generations or children 
and grandchildren in the selected documents. 
Survival – This code includes language of survival as related to the impacts of climate 
change and the UNFCCC process the selected documents. 
Vulnerability – This code covers any language of being vulnerable or populations 
defined as vulnerable in reference to the impacts of climate change; often a 
characterization of nations in the selected documents. 
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